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The present study was aimed at experimentally investigating effects of causal
explanations for depression on treatment-seeking behavior and beliefs. Participants at a
large Southern university (N = 139; 78% female; average age 19.77) received bogus
screening results indicating high depression risk, then viewed an explanation of
depression etiology (fixed biological vs. malleable) before receiving a treatment referral
(antidepressant vs. psychotherapy). Participants accepted the cover story at face value,
but some expressed doubts about the screening task’s ability to properly assess their
individual depression. Within the skeptics, those given a fixed biological explanation for
depression were relatively unwilling to accept either treatment, but those given a
malleable explanation were much more willing to accept psychotherapy. Importantly,
differences in skepticism were not due to levels of actual depressive symptoms. The
present findings indicate that information about the malleability of depression may have a
protective effect for persons who otherwise would not accept treatment.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author is deeply grateful to her mentor and dissertation committee chair, E.
Samuel Winer, without whom this research would not have been possible. The author
also wishes to acknowledge the members of her dissertation committee, namely Michael
R. Nadorff, Cliff McKinney, and Jennifer C. Veilleux, for their valuable input throughout
the process of designing, conducting, and presenting this study.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................ ii
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. vi
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... viii
CHAPTER
I.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................1
Causal Explanations for Depression ......................................................................1
Biological Causal Explanations and Essentialism ...........................................4
Is Biological Essentialism Warranted? ............................................................5
Biological Explanations, Coping Strategies, and Treatment .................................8
Emotion Malleability Beliefs ..........................................................................9
Treatment Expectancies.................................................................................10
Rationale for the Present Study ...........................................................................12
Hypotheses ..........................................................................................................13

II.

METHODS .........................................................................................................15
Study Overview ...................................................................................................15
Measures ..............................................................................................................16
Beliefs about Causes of Depression ..............................................................16
Depressive Symptoms ...................................................................................16
Emotion and Regulation Beliefs ....................................................................17
Prognostic Pessimism ....................................................................................18
Treatment Expectancies for Psychotherapy ..................................................18
Treatment Expectancies for Antidepressant Medication ...............................19
Implicit Association Test (IAT) ....................................................................19
Willingness to Accept Treatment ..................................................................20
Procedure .............................................................................................................23
Experimental Manipulation of Causal Explanations .....................................24
Fixed biological explanation. ..................................................................24
Malleable explanation. ............................................................................28
Post-Manipulation Questionnaires ................................................................31
Treatment Referrals .......................................................................................31
Debriefing ......................................................................................................32
iii

III.

RESULTS ...........................................................................................................33
Participants ..........................................................................................................33
Missing Data and Internal Consistency ...............................................................34
Manipulation Checks ...........................................................................................36
Hypothesis 1 ........................................................................................................41
Preliminary Analyses.....................................................................................41
Main Analyses ...............................................................................................41
Hypothesis 2 ........................................................................................................42
Preliminary Analyses.....................................................................................42
Main Analyses ...............................................................................................42
Hypothesis 3 ........................................................................................................44
Preliminary Analyses.....................................................................................44
Main Analyses ...............................................................................................46
Hypothesis 4 ........................................................................................................46
Preliminary Analyses.....................................................................................46
Main Analyses ...............................................................................................46
Exploratory Analyses ..........................................................................................47
Current Depressive Symptoms and Willingness to Accept Treatment .........47
Treatment History and Willingness to Accept Treatment .............................47
Credulity and Willingness to Accept Treatment ...........................................48
Credulity and Perceived Credibility and Effectiveness of Treatments..........62
Credulity and Prognostic Pessimism .............................................................64
Causal Explanation and ERBS Subscales .....................................................64
Credulity and ERBS Subscales .....................................................................65
Causal Explanation and Depression Mind Set ..............................................66
Credulity and Depression Mind Set ..............................................................67
Correlations within Each Explanation Condition ..........................................67

IV.

DISCUSSION .....................................................................................................72
Explanations for Depression, Elaboration Likelihood, and Treatment
Willingness ..............................................................................................72
Factors Correlated with Treatment Beliefs and Willingness to Accept
Treatment ...........................................................................................78
Causal Explanations for Depression and Beliefs about Emotions ......................81
Implications of the Present Study for Treatment of Depression .........................82
Implications for Treatment with Psychotherapy ...........................................83
Implications for Treatment with Antidepressant Medication ........................84
Strengths and Limitations ....................................................................................87
Use of a Student Population ..........................................................................87
Random Assignment to Treatment Option ....................................................88
Decision Not to Include a Control Group......................................................88
Use of Videos ................................................................................................89
Future Directions .................................................................................................90
Conclusion ...........................................................................................................92
iv

REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 93
APPENDIX
A.

FUNNEL DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE PRESENTED VIA
COMPUTER .........................................................................................103

B.

DEBRIEFING SCRIPT PRESENTED VIA VIDEO .......................................105

C.

MEASURES .....................................................................................................109
Emotion Regulation and Beliefs Scale (ERBS) ................................................110
Credibility/Expectancy Questionnaire (CEQ) ...................................................115
Quick Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology—Self-Report (QIDSSR) .........................................................................................................117

D.

IRB APPROVAL ..............................................................................................119

v

LIST OF TABLES
1

Participant Characteristics (N = 139) ...............................................................34

2

Beliefs about the Causes of Depression ...........................................................38

3

Participants Grouped by Explanation Condition and Treatment
Referral Type .......................................................................................39

4

Variable Means in Fixed Biological and Malleable Explanation
Conditions ............................................................................................43

5

2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA Comparing Willingness to Accept Treatment across
Treatment Referral Type, Causal Explanation Condition, and
Binary Doubts Variable .......................................................................49

6

Separate 2 x 2 ANOVAs Comparing Willingness to Accept Treatment
across Treatment Referral Type and Causal Explanation
Condition in Participants With and Without Doubts ...........................51

7

2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA Comparing Current Depressive Symptoms across
Treatment Referral Type, Causal Explanation Condition, and
Binary Doubts Variable .......................................................................55

8

Separate 2 x 2 ANOVAs Comparing Current Depressive Symptoms
across Treatment Referral Type and Causal Explanation
Condition in Participants With and Without Doubts ...........................57

9

2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA Comparing Willingness to Accept Treatment across
Treatment Referral Type, Causal Explanation Condition, and
Binary Doubts Variable when Adjusting for Current
Depressive Symptoms ..........................................................................60

10

Separate 2 x 2 ANOVAs Comparing Willingness to Accept Treatment
across Treatment Referral Type and Causal Explanation
Condition in Participants With and Without Doubts When
Adjusting for Current Depressive Symptoms ......................................61

11

Variable Means in Fixed Biological and Malleable Explanation
Conditions for Participants With and Without Doubts ........................70
vi

12

Bivariate Correlations between Variables within Each Causal
Explanation Condition .........................................................................68

13

Bivariate Correlations with Willingness to Accept Treatment within
Each Combination of Causal Explanation and Referral
Condition..............................................................................................71

vii

LIST OF FIGURES
1

Mean levels of willingness to accept treatment within each
combination of causal explanation for depression and treatment
referral type, for participants for reported no doubts about the
study (top) and those who did report doubts (bottom). ........................60

2

Mean levels of depressive symptoms within each combination of
causal explanation for depression and treatment referral type,
for participants for reported no doubts about the study (top) and
those who did report doubts (bottom). .................................................58

viii

INTRODUCTION
A growing number of studies indicate that biological causal explanations for
depression are associated with negative beliefs about key aspects of depression and its
treatment (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Lebowitz, 2014). In light of these findings, the
present study was designed to examine effects of causal explanations for depression on
willingness to accept psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy, respectively.
Causal Explanations for Depression
Depressed individuals who view their symptoms as being caused by biological
factors such as a medical illness, genes/heredity, or a chemical imbalance in the brain
perceive their depression as less controllable and expect to be depressed for longer than
depressed individuals who endorse other kinds of causal explanations (Brown et al.,
2007; Lebowitz, Ahn, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2013, Study 1).
Moreover, relationships between biological causal explanations for depression
and negative beliefs are supported by experimental evidence (Kemp, Lickel, & Deacon,
2014; Lebowitz et al., 2013, Study 2). For example, depressed participants who received
bogus test results indicating that they had a serotonin deficit rated themselves as less
capable of regulating their negative moods, expected their symptoms to last longer, and
predicted lower odds of eventual recovery, when compared to depressed participants who
got bogus test results showing normal neurotransmitter levels (Kemp et al., 2014).
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Similarly, Lebowitz and colleagues manipulated causal explanations for depression in
individuals with high and low levels of depressive symptoms by showing them
informational videos (2013, Study 2). One group watched a “biological illness” video that
described depression as a brain disorder largely caused by genes and stated “depressed
people have abnormalities in critical areas of the brain.” A second group watched a
“malleable” video, which stated that “lifestyle factors like diet, exercise, and levels of
stress” affect whether or not depression-related genes get “turned on,” and that learning
new ways of thinking and interacting with others changes patterns of brain activity in
depressed persons. Both videos described various treatment options, but the biological
illness video emphasized antidepressant medication, whereas the malleable video
emphasized psychotherapy. A third group of participants served as controls and did not
watch a video (Lebowitz et al., 2013, Study 2).
Among individuals with higher levels of depressive symptoms, those assigned to
the malleable condition perceived themselves as more capable of improving their
negative moods than did participants in either the biological illness or control conditions,
and they reported lower levels of hopelessness, expected their own symptoms to be
shorter-lived, and believed they had higher odds of recovery than did depressed
participants in the control group (Lebowitz et al., 2013, Study 2). Interestingly, depressed
participants in the biological illness group also reported less hopelessness and more
ability to change their negative moods than did controls, though they did not differ from
the control group on perceived duration of symptoms or odds of recovery. These findings
were attributed to the fact that both videos portrayed depression as a treatable problem
and presented treatment options. Among mildly depressed and nondepressed individuals,
2

those assigned to the malleable condition perceived “the average depressed person” as
more able to improve their negative moods than did participants in either the biological
illness or control conditions. In contrast, individuals in the biological illness condition
expected the average depressed person’s symptoms to last longer and be less likely to
remit than did participants in either of the other two groups, which did not differ. Finally,
across depressed and nondepressed participants, there were no significant effects of
condition on guilt associated with depression or perceived odds of recovery with
treatment (the latter will be discussed further in the Biological Explanations, Coping
Strategies, and Treatment section of this document).
In an experimental study in which non-depressed participants were asked to
imagine that they had been diagnosed with depression, participants reported less sense of
personal responsibility for symptoms after reading a biological causal explanation for
depression than they did after reading a biopsychosocial explanation (Deacon & Baird,
2009). However, after reading the biological explanation participants also reported lower
perceived ability to control their symptoms, believed their depression would be more
chronic, and said they would be less likely to eventually recover. Similarly, among the
general public (i.e., persons not pre-selected for elevated symptoms or history of
psychological disorders), experimental induction of biological causal explanations for
mental disorders leads to increases in perceived severity of psychological problems as
well as perceived dangerousness of individuals with such problems (Kvaale, Haslam, &
Gottdiener, 2013).
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Biological Causal Explanations and Essentialism
Findings from qualitative research illustrate a belief that the biological
characteristics of persons with psychological disorders make them categorically different
from persons without such disorders, and that their status as disordered will determine
many aspects of their future. For example, in a synthesis of qualitative studies, Malpass
and colleagues (2009) identified a pattern whereby depressed individuals described the
experience of being prescribed an antidepressant—which necessarily communicates a
biological explanation for depression—as something that reduced self-blame but also
categorically changed their perceptions of themselves by confirming that they were not
“normal” (Malpass et al., 2009). Another qualitative study included this quote from the
mother of an adolescent girl with psychological difficulties (Hess, Gantt, Lacasse, &
Vierling-Claassen, 2014, p. 196):
She’s schizoaffective bipolar; the prognosis is that there is no cure—that she
needs to learn to live with it the best she can. I’m expecting her to regress. ... Her brain is
wired in a way that her mental illness will be a monkey on her back the rest of her life. It
is unlikely she will ever be able to hold down a real job.
Hess and colleagues also quoted an adult woman saying the following about her
own depressive symptoms (2014, p. 193):
It’s a chemical imbalance—it’s not gonna go away with ... you know; I can’t—
I’m not one of those that could take medication for a couple of years and then be good. ...
I’m stuck.

4

One framework for understanding these comments relates to the concept of
essentialism—the idea that persons belong to discrete kinds or categories based on innate,
unchanging aspects of their nature or identities (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Haslam &
Kvaale, 2015; Kendler, Zachar, & Craver, 2011). Factors such as genes or neurobiology
are often viewed as being outside of a person’s control, fixed, and central to identity
(Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Haslam & Kvaale, 2015). Because personal responsibility
is predicated on a behavior or situation being controllable (Weiner, 1993), it is not
surprising that attributing mental disorders to biological factors tends to reduce blame.
However, as Haslam and Kvaale (2015) argue, biological explanations can trigger a type
of essentialism grounded in the belief that biological features make persons with mental
disorders “categorically different: possessors of the pathological essence.” In turn,
essentialist views give rise to increases in perceived dangerousness, increased social
distancing, and poorer perceived prognosis, as member of the public perceive negative
outcomes as being deterministically written into the biology of persons with
psychological problems. This framework helps to explain how information about the
malleability of biological and genetic risk factors may help to offset or even reverse the
negative effects of biological explanations on perceptions of depressed persons (Lebowitz
et al., 2013, Study 2).
Is Biological Essentialism Warranted?
The heritability of major depressive disorder (MDD) is estimated at 37% [95%CI,
31%-42%], based on twin studies comparing concordance rates for monozygotic
(identical) and dizygotic (fraternal) twins, and family studies comparing MDD
prevalence rates in relatives of MDD-diagnosed probands and those of comparison
5

subjects (Sullivan, Neale, & Kendler, 2000). Also, heritability may be higher than 37%
for recurrent cases that begin earlier in life (Levinson, 2006). However, researchers have
yet to identify specific genetic markers that reliably account for the observed MDD
heritability. For example, a recent “mega-analysis” of genome-wide association studies
(GWAS) examined genetic polymorphisms in approximately 16,000 MDD-diagnosed
subjects and 60,000 controls divided across discovery and replication phases, and the
analysis produced null findings (i.e., no locus achieved genome-wide significance across
discovery and replication phases; Major Depression Working Group of the Psychiatric
GWAS Consortium, 2013). In addition, a polygenic risk profile developed using 80% of
the cases from the discovery sample and used to predict MDD vs. control status in the
other 20% only accounted for 6% of the variance in status (Major Depression Working
Group of the Psychiatric GWAS Consortium, 2013).
One possible explanation for the difficulty researchers have had finding genetic
variants linked to MDD has to do with the complexity and heterogeneity of cases that are
grouped together within the diagnostic label of MDD (Bogdan, Nikolova, & Pizzagalli,
2013; Major Depression Working Group of the Psychiatric GWAS Consortium, 2013). If
MDD is not a unified construct, it may be more useful to search for genetic markers at the
level of specific endophenotypes (or, intermediate phenotypes) such as reward processing
or stress sensitivity (Bogdan et al., 2013; Miller & Rockstroh, 2013). Indeed, there is
evidence to suggest that genetic variants that decrease the activity of dopamine in
subcortical regions such as the striatum and increase the activity of dopamine in the
cortex may be linked to deficits in reward learning and anticipation of reward. However,
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most of the studies conducted thus far have not found links between MDD and genetic
variants associated with decreased reward processing (Bogdan et al., 2013).
Genetic variants that play a role in the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis
have been linked to differential responses to stress, as well as to MDD in some GWAS
results (though recall that the largest GWAS to date produced null findings; Major
Depression Working Group of the Psychiatric GWAS Consortium, 2013). In fact,
arguably the strongest findings linking genes to MDD to date are those showing that
certain genetic variants involved in the HPA-axis and stress reactivity may confer
elevated risk for developing depression when exposed to highly stressful environments
(Binder & Nemeroff, 2010; Bogdan et al., 2013; Caspi, Hariri, Holmes, Uher, & Moffitt,
2010). Notably, however, these findings support the existence of gene x environment
interactions, rather than main effects of gene variants on MDD.
It is possible that future research will yield more robust evidence of genetic or
neurobiological factors that account for the observed heritability of depression. However,
it is also possible that our current heritability figures overestimate the role of genes in the
etiology of depression. For example, heritability estimates derived from twin studies are
based on the assumption that twins reared together share an identical environment
regardless of whether they are monozygotic or dizygotic (i.e., the “equal environment
assumption”), and some critics argue that this assumption is flawed and leads to inflated
estimates of genetic contributions to variance (Joseph, 1998). Family studies also have
limitations; for example, having family members who have been depressed might
increase the chances of an individual seeking clinical services, and thereby increase rates
of diagnosis (Sullivan et al., 2000). Moreover, clinicians frequently gather information
7

about a patient’s family history as part of routine care, and that knowledge may influence
diagnostic impressions; in fact, some would argue that family history should be a key
consideration in diagnostic decision-making, because psychological disorders are
heritable. If clinicians’ belief that depression is heritable is, in turn, based on data
showing that depression is diagnosed more often in family members of depressed
individuals, then a tautological feedback loop may arise between research and clinical
practice.
Thus, genetically-determined neurobiology almost certainly plays some role in the
development of depression, but the extent and nature of that role are currently unknown,
and it may take many more years of research before those questions can be answered.
Furthermore, even if we were to find robust evidence supporting strong genetic and
biological contribution to the etiology of depression, the way in which that information is
presented could have a negative impact on depressed individuals.
Biological Explanations, Coping Strategies, and Treatment
Evidence linking biological explanations for depression to negative, fatalistic
views of prognosis (e.g., expectations that symptoms will be (a) chronic, (b) resistant to
any efforts to change, and (c) unlikely to remit) is especially troubling given that
expected prognosis influences actual outcomes across a range of clinical conditions,
including depression (Glattacker, Heyduck, & Meffert, 2013; Kirsch & Low, 2013;
Mondloch, Cole, & Frank, 2001). Thus, it is possible that biological explanations for
depression might have a negative impact on actual outcomes in the lives of depressed
persons.
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There are several plausible means by which such an impact could occur. First, as
Kirsch and Low point out (2013), a negative view of one’s prognosis is a form of
hopelessness, and hopelessness is a core component of depression and one that tends to
perpetuate other depressive symptoms (Roepke & Seligman, 2016). In short, believing
you will always be depressed is depressing. Second, biological explanations contribute to
a belief that one’s own efforts to improve one’s depressed mood will not make a
difference (Deacon & Baird, 2009; Lebowitz, 2014; Lebowitz et al., 2013), and this belief
can make a person less likely to engage in effective emotion regulation strategies or make
positive lifestyle changes (Kneeland, Dovidio, Joormann, & Clark, 2016), or more likely
to believe that those positive changes will ultimately result in something negative (Winer
et al., 2017; Winer & Salem, 2016). Third, persons who believe they are biologically
fated to struggle with depression might also have low expectations for treatment—
especially non-drug treatments such as psychotherapy (Deacon & Baird, 2009)—and
treatment expectancies are strongly linked to treatment engagement and outcomes
(Greenberg, Constantino, & Bruce, 2006).
Emotion Malleability Beliefs
Perceived ability to improve one’s depressed mood is closely related to emotion
malleability beliefs, or the extent to which one believes that emotions are malleable and
can be changed through personal efforts (De Castella et al., 2013; Kneeland et al., 2016;
Tamir, John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2007; Veilleux, Salomaa, Shaver, Zielinski, & Pollert,
2015). Belief that one’s emotions are malleable is associated with more successful
emotion regulation, due to the use of more effective strategies enacted earlier on in
emotion-eliciting situations (Kneeland et al., 2016; Tamir et al., 2007). Conversely, belief
9

that one’s emotions are uncontrollable is associated with reliance on ineffective and
potentially harmful strategies such as rumination and emotion suppression (Kneeland et
al., 2016; Tamir et al., 2007). Given that biological explanations reduce perceived
controllability of depressed moods, it is possible that biological explanations for
depression might impede effective emotion regulation by depressed persons, who are
already prone to relying on maladaptive emotion regulation strategies (Joormann &
Vanderlind, 2014; Kneeland et al., 2016).
Treatment Expectancies
It is also possible that biological explanations for depression could reduce
perceived helpfulness of psychotherapy, thus interfering with help-seeking, therapeutic
engagement, and psychotherapy outcomes (Kichuk, Lebowitz, & Adams, 2015). The link
between treatment expectancies and psychotherapeutic process and outcomes is already
well established (Delsignore & Schnyder, 2007; Greenberg et al., 2006). Much less is
known about whether or not causal explanations for depression impact treatment
expectancies for psychotherapy, but there is evidence suggesting that they might. For
example, research indicates that hopelessness is associated with lower treatment
expectancies (Goldfarb, 2002). Although Lebowitz and colleagues did not find a
significant link between biological explanations and scores on a general hopelessness
measure (2013), biological explanations have been linked to hopelessness regarding
perceived likelihood of recovery from depression (Deacon & Baird, 2009; Kemp et al.,
2014; Kvaale, Gottdiener, & Haslam, 2013; Kvaale, Haslam, et al., 2013; Lebowitz et al.,
2013), which is arguably more relevant than general hopelessness in shaping treatment
expectancies.
10

There is also evidence that treatment expectancies are lower when causal beliefs
do not match treatment modality—for example, persons who endorse biological
explanations rate non-pharmacological treatments such as psychotherapy as less likely to
be helpful for them than do those with different causal attributions for depression (Iselin
& Addis, 2003). Consistent with this idea, when causal explanations for depression were
experimentally manipulated in participants instructed to imagine they were depressed,
biological explanations led to significantly lower perceived helpfulness ratings for
psychotherapy, but higher perceived helpfulness for antidepressants (Deacon & Baird,
2009). After participants read a biopsychosocial explanation these effects were reversed,
with psychotherapy rated as more helpful and antidepressants as less helpful (Deacon &
Baird, 2009). These findings represent initial experimental evidence suggesting that
causal explanations for depression might shape treatment expectancies. However, use of
a repeated-measures design in this study may have produced demand characteristics,
because participants likely framed the task as a comparison of two competing models.
The two extant studies that experimentally manipulated causal beliefs in
depressed participants included measures of perceived helpfulness of treatment (Kemp et
al., 2014; Lebowitz et al., 2013, Study 2), but in both cases elements of study design
make it difficult to interpret the relevant results. Lebowitz and colleagues found no
significant differences between individuals who viewed fixed biological, malleable, or no
causal explanations on a question about how long they expected their symptoms to last if
they received treatment (2013, Study 2). However, because participants were not asked
about psychotherapy or antidepressant medications separately, it is possible that
participants who viewed different causal explanations had differential perceptions about
11

the helpfulness of these two treatment options, without there being a difference in
perceived helpfulness of treatment overall.
Similarly, Kemp and colleagues (2014), found no significant difference in
perceived credibility or helpfulness of psychosocial treatment when comparing
participants in the serotonin deficiency condition and those in the control condition, but
the serotonin deficiency group rated pharmacological treatment as significantly more
credible and more helpful than the control group. These findings are also difficult to
interpret because the control group was not given an alternative explanation for their
symptoms; therefore, receiving “normal” test results might have limited their belief that
either type of treatment would be helpful (Kemp et al., 2014). Alternatively, depressed
individuals might have more fixed beliefs about causes of depression—perhaps due to
greater previous exposure to information about the disorder, or due to personal
experiences—and thus a one-time manipulation might not be sufficient to change their
beliefs.
Rationale for the Present Study
The studies discussed thus far demonstrate that biological causal explanations for
depression—in particular, explanations that promote a fixed view of biological or genetic
factors—can lower perceived ability to improve one’s mood and may contribute to
negative, fatalistic views of prognosis. In light of those findings, it is reasonable to ask
whether biological causal explanations might interfere with psychotherapy, perhaps by
limiting expectations for improvement in therapy and/or undermining the perceived
credibility of non-medical treatments. At present, this is an empirical question. There is a
general lack of experimental research examining the impact of biological causal
12

explanations on beliefs about treatment, and aspects of prior study design (i.e., use of a
repeated-measures design, lack of differentiation between antidepressants and
psychotherapy in treatment questions, only including a biological explanation condition
and control condition) make it difficult to interpret the handful of experimental findings
that have been conducted on the topic. Further, the experimental studies published to date
have measured outcomes via self-report; to our knowledge none have examined the
effects of causal explanations for depression on actual behaviors that might be relevant to
treatment. The present study was aimed at addressing these gaps.
Hypotheses
The primary purpose of the present study was to examine whether or not causal
explanations for depression and type of treatment offered have an interactive effect on
willingness to accept treatment. Participants were given a cover story stating that they
were at high risk of developing depression. Then, based on random assignment, they
were presented with either a fixed biological or a malleable explanation for depression
before being referred for treatment in the form of either psychotherapy or antidepressant
medication.
Specifically, the present study was aimed at testing the following hypotheses:
1) The effect of explanation (fixed vs. malleable) on willingness to accept treatment
will differ based on treatment option (antidepressant vs. psychotherapy).
•

Within the antidepressant referral condition, participants who receive the
fixed explanation for depression will report greater willingness to accept
treatment than those who receive the malleable explanation.
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•

Within the psychotherapy referral condition, participants who receive the
fixed explanation for depression will report lower willingness to accept
treatment than those who receive the malleable explanation.

2) Individuals in the fixed condition will report lower treatment expectancies (i.e.,
perceived helpfulness, perceived credibility) for psychotherapy and higher
treatment expectancies for antidepressant medication than those in the malleable
condition.
3) Individuals in the fixed condition will endorse a more negative perceived
prognosis for depression (i.e., more severe and chronic symptoms, lower
likelihood of full recovery) than those than those in the malleable condition.
4) Individuals in the fixed condition will report stronger endorsement of the idea that
individuals are constrained by their emotional states.

14

METHODS
Study Overview
First, participants completed a computerized task and were presented with bogus
test results indicating that, based on their scores on the task, they are at high risk for
experiencing depression within the next 6 months. The computer task itself had the
advantage of not being associated with a biological model of depression in the same way
that other procedures, such as swabbing of cheek cells, might be. Together, the computer
task and the bogus results were intended to serve as a plausible cover story (see King et
al., 2008, for a real-world example of a major depression risk prediction algorithm) that
could reasonably be expected to yield more valid data than might be obtained by simply
asking individuals to imagine being depressed. Next, following the design used by
Lebowitz and colleagues (Lebowitz et al., 2013), participants were randomly assigned to
watch either a video presenting a fixed biological explanation for depression, or a video
presenting an explanation that emphasizes the malleability of risk factors for depression.
Participants then completed self-report measures assessing treatment expectancies for
antidepressant drugs and psychotherapy separately. Beliefs about emotion regulation and
other relevant variables were also measured. Finally, participants viewed and responded
to a series of video prompts encouraging them to seek treatment and emphasizing the
15

importance of early intervention in treating depression. The videos offered participants
the chance to make an initial appointment to discuss treatment with a care provider.
Again based on random assignment, half of the individuals in the fixed explanation
condition and half of those in the malleable explanation condition were offered an
appointment with a health care provider to discuss antidepressant medication, whereas
the other half in each condition was offered an appointment with a counselor to discuss
psychotherapy. Participants’ decisions to accept or decline the appointment served as a
behavioral measure of treatment acceptance, and those who declined the appointment
were asked follow-up questions about their willingness to accept treatment in the future.
Measures
Beliefs about Causes of Depression
As a manipulation check, participants were asked to rate on a scale from 1-7 (1 =
very unlikely, 7 = very likely) the likelihood that each of several factors “might cause
sad, blue, or depressed feelings”. The factors rated were based on the factors measured by
Lebowitz and colleagues (2013): “Genetics,” “Brain chemistry or other biochemical
imbalance,” “Day-to-day problems and/or stress,” “Beliefs or style of thinking,”
“Abnormal brain structure/development,” “Brain injury,” “Substance abuse,” “Weakness
of character,” “Problems from childhood or the way you were raised,” and “Recent
traumatic events.”
Depressive Symptoms
The Quick Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology – Self-Report (QIDS-SR;
Rush et al., 2003) was used to assess current depressive symptoms. The QIDS-SR is a
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widely-used and validated self-report questionnaire that asks participants to rate the
extent to which (0 = not at all, 3 = severely) they have experienced each of 16 symptoms
over the previous week. Some items are aggregated for scoring, such that the total score
covers 9 symptom domains: Insomnia/Hypersomnia, Sadness, Weight/Appetite Changes,
Guilt/Worthlessness, Difficulty Concentrating, Thoughts of Death/Suicide, Loss of
Interest, Fatigue, and Psychomotor Retardation/Agitation. Item 12 of the QIDS-SR was
administered separately at the end of the study and used to assess for current suicidality,
according to IRB-approved procedures. The remaining items (sans item 12) were scored
according to the standard procedure and included as a covariate in some analyses, as
described in the Results section of this manuscript.
Emotion and Regulation Beliefs
The Emotion and Regulation Beliefs Scale (ERBS; Veilleux et al., 2015) was
administered to assess participants’ beliefs about whether or not emotions can be
regulated and whether or not it is worthwhile to attempt to regulate emotions. The ERBS
is a validated, 21-item self-report scale that measures beliefs in three domains: Emotion
Constraint, or the extent to which one feels constrained by emotions; Regulation Worth,
or the extent to which one believes it is valuable to try to regulate emotions; and
Hijacking, or the extent to which one believes that emotions can cause a person to lose
control of his or her behavior. Responses are given on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly agree,
5 = strongly disagree).
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Prognostic Pessimism
Perceptions about the typical prognosis associated with depression was assessed
via the following questions: “How long do you think that the average depressed person
will continue to feel sad, blue, or depressed,” and “How long do you think that the
average depressed person will continue to feel sad, blue, or depressed if they receive
treatment?” Responses were given using a 9-point scale comprising Less than 1 week
(coded as 1), 1 to 2 weeks, 2 to 4 weeks, 1 month to 6 months, 6 months to 1 year, 1 to 2
years, 2 to 5 years, More than 5 years, but not indefinitely, and Indefinitely (coded as 9;
Lebowitz et al., 2013). In addition, participants were asked to estimate on a 0-100% scale
the odds that a person’s depressive symptoms will “go away”, as well as the odds that a
person’s depressive symptoms will “return or grow worse” in the future.
Treatment Expectancies for Psychotherapy
Expected helpfulness and credibility of psychotherapy was assessed using a brief
written description of the treatment followed by the Credibility/Expectancy
Questionnaire (CEQ; Devilly & Borkovec, 2000), a validated 6-item self-report measure.
The CEQ includes 4 items measuring credibility (such as, “At this point, how logical
does the above treatment seem?”) and 2 items measuring expectancy (such as, “At this
point, how much do you really feel that this treatment would help to reduce depressive
symptoms?”). Because participants may not personally have felt depressed at the time of
the study, items were modified slightly by dropping the words “you” and “your,” to allow
participants to respond based on their perceptions of the treatment for depression in
general. The CEQ has been shown to possess adequate test-retest reliability and internal
consistency (Devilly & Borkovec, 2000), and it has been used in previous research
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examining the effects of causal explanations for depression (Kemp et al., 2014). For the
present study, the CEQ was scored using the procedures described by Nock and
colleagues (Kemp et al., 2014; Nock, Ferriter, & Holmberg, 2007). Items 1, 2, 3, and 5
were scored on a 9-point Likert-type scale (1 = Not a lot of sense / No improvement, 9 =
A lot of sense / Very much improvement). Participants responded to Items 4 and 6 using
an 11-point scale (i.e., 10% intervals ranging from 0% - 100%), but these two items were
converted to a 9-point scale (responses from 40%-60% are collapsed into a single value
and scored a 5) at scoring, to match the other items in the measure.
Treatment Expectancies for Antidepressant Medication
Similarly, expected helpfulness and credibility of antidepressant medication was
assessed using a brief written description of the treatment, followed by the CEQ (Devilly
& Borkovec, 2000). All item wording and scoring procedures was the same as those
described above in the Treatment Expectancies for Psychotherapy section. Treatment
expectancies for psychotherapy and antidepressant medication were assessed in
counterbalanced order, and all participants completed the CEQ for both types of
treatment.
Implicit Association Test (IAT)
In the IAT, participants are instructed to match different categories of stimuli as
quickly as possible, and scores are computed by comparing average response times for
different category combinations, with the assumption that participants will give faster
responses when matching categories that they perceive to be similar than when matching
categories that they perceive to be dissimilar (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).
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For the present study, the stimuli were taken from previous research using the IAT to
study implicit depressive attitudes, and included: I, Me, Self, Myself, Mine, They, Them,
Their, Theirs, Other, Depressed, Helpless, Hopeless, Gloomy, Withdrawn, Smiling, Glad,
Cheerful, Joyful, Delighted (Meites, Deveney, Steele, Holmes, & Pizzagalli, 2008). Data
from the IAT were not intended to be examined as part of the present study, and these
data were not logged due to experimenter error. The task simply served as part of the
cover story—participants were told after completing the task that it had been a
“depression screening test”—so that they could be given bogus test results showing that
they were at high risk for depression.
Willingness to Accept Treatment
The computer program used to assess willingness to accept treatment was created
and administered using E-Prime 2.0 Professional. The program comprised a series of
questions, interspersed with short videos depicting an actor dressed professionally, sitting
at a desk in a laboratory. The actor selected to appear in these videos was blind to the
hypotheses of the study, and was the same actor who presented the bogus depression
screening test feedback and the causal explanations for depression.
In the first video viewed by all participants, the actor explained that early
intervention is a key factor in successful treatment of depression. The actor stated that in
light of the viewer’s score on the depression screening test, it is strongly recommended
that he or she look into treatment right away. The actor then presented two referral
options; the order in which they were presented depended on the treatment referral
condition to which that participant had been assigned. Participants in the two
antidepressant-first referral groups initially viewed a video presenting the opportunity to
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schedule an appointment with the student health center to discuss antidepressant
medication with a health care provider, whereas participants in the two psychotherapyfirst referral groups initially viewed a video presenting the opportunity to schedule an
appointment with the student counseling center to discuss psychotherapy with a
counselor. In both videos, the actor made clear that the participant could make the
appointment right away via computer by watching the following set of videos and using
the keyboard to respond to onscreen prompts.
After watching the initial video, participants were asked via computer if they were
willing to schedule an appointment that day. Participants who declined to schedule an
appointment viewed follow-up videos and answered questions about their willingness to
schedule an appointment if they were to experience an increase in symptoms. After
participants responded to the first treatment referral, they repeated the process with the
second treatment option (i.e., those who were initially offered the psychotherapy referral
were then offered the antidepressant medication referral, and vice versa). Only data from
the initial treatment referral is included in analyses in the present manuscript, and
henceforth the term “referral type” will be used to denote the first referral presented to
each participant.
For each treatment option, willingness to accept treatment was operationally
defined on the basis of (a) whether or not participants chose to schedule an appointment,
and (b) if so, what date they chose, or (c) if not, then whether they would be willing to
schedule an appointment in the future. Specifically, treatment willingness was scored
using the following 11-point scale:
11 = Participant scheduled an appointment and selected a date 0-7 days away.
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10 = Participant scheduled an appointment and selected a date 8-14 days away.
09 = Participant scheduled an appointment and selected a date 15-21 days away.
08 = Participant scheduled an appointment and selected a date 22 or more days
away.
07 = Participant declined to schedule an appointment right away, but “definitely”
intends to call the relevant resource (i.e., either the Student Health Center or
Student Counseling Services) within a week to schedule.
06 = Participant declined to schedule an appointment right away, but might call
the relevant resource within a week to make an appointment (indicated
greater than 50% likelihood).
05 = Participant declined to schedule an appointment right away, but might call
the relevant resource within a week to make an appointment (indicated 50%
or lower likelihood).
04 = Participant declined to schedule an appointment right away and will
"probably not" call the relevant resource within a week to make an
appointment, but would "definitely" make an appointment if depressive
symptoms were to increase in the future.
03 = Participant declined to schedule an appointment right away and will
"probably not" call the relevant resource within a week to make an
appointment, but might make an appointment if symptoms were to increase
in the future (indicated greater than 50% likelihood).
02 = Participant declined to schedule an appointment right away and will
"probably not" call the relevant resource within a week to make an
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appointment, but might make an appointment if symptoms were to increase
in the future (indicated 50% or lower likelihood).
01 = Participant declined to schedule an appointment right away, will "probably
not" call the relevant resource within a week to make an appointment, and
would “probably not” make an appointment even if symptoms were to
increase in the future.
Procedure
Participants who volunteered through SONA to take part in the study were
scheduled to come to the lab for the experimental session. Upon arriving, participants
were presented with an initial informed consent form stating that the goal of the study is
to examine how individual differences relate to responses on computerized tasks. The
form also stated that the study would involve completing tasks on a computer and
responding to questions, and that all efforts would be made to ensure the confidentiality
of responses.
A researcher seated the participant in front of a computer and stated that the
computer would guide the participant through each part of the session. The researcher
gave the participant a set of headphones and instructed the participant to wear them
throughout the session, as some parts of the session would include audio. The researcher
opened the computer program in E-Prime 2.0 Professional, which began with the Implicit
Association Test (IAT). Once the instructions appeared onscreen, the researcher left the
room. After the IAT, the computer automatically presented the QIDS-SR (sans item 12).
Participants responded using the keyboard.
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Experimental Manipulation of Causal Explanations
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four cells: the fixed biological
explanation/antidepressant referral cell, the fixed biological explanation /psychotherapy
referral cell, the malleable explanation /antidepressant referral cell, or the malleable
explanation /psychotherapy referral cell. After completing the QIDS-SR, the computer
automatically presented either the fixed biological explanation video or the malleable
explanation video. The script of each video was presented by an actor wearing
professional attire and seated at a desk in a laboratory. The same actor appeared in both
causal explanation videos, as well as in both sets of treatment referral videos, and was
blind to the study hypotheses.
Fixed biological explanation. The script for the fixed biological explanation
video was as follows:
Hello, I work in the field of clinical psychology as a researcher and
clinician, and I want to thank you for your time today. You just completed a
computer task called the “Reaction Time Test.” The Reaction Time Test is a
recently-developed depression screening test that measures dysfunction in the
brain’s processing of emotional information, which is an early and highly reliable
marker of depression risk.
Researchers at Mississippi State University are currently developing an
online service that will allow students to log in, take the depression screening test,
and get immediate feedback about their risk of developing depression, based on
their scores. They will also be provided with information to help them reduce
their risk.
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After you finished the test, the computer automatically calculated your
score. Your score will now be presented, along with some information to help you
understand what your score means.
If you scored in the Low Risk range, a Low Risk video will play to explain
your score. If you scored in the Moderate Risk range, a Moderate Risk video will
play, and if you scored in the High Risk range, a High Risk video will play.
[voice over as graph is displayed]
The graph you see now shows your results from the depression screening
test. This video is playing because your reaction times were faster when Me
related words were in the same category with Sad words, and Not-Me related
words were in the same category with Happy words. As you can see on the graph,
your scores fall in the High Risk range. Your results indicate that certain parts of
your brain are hypersensitive to negative information. Even if you have not
consciously noticed mood problems yet, your test results indicate that you are at
very high risk of becoming depressed in the near future, because the parts of your
brain that process negative emotional information are overactive. In order to help
you understand what your scores mean, some information about depression will
now be presented.
Many people who have symptoms of depression, or know someone who
does, wonder what causes these kinds of problems. Mood problems, such as
depression, run in families. Genetics are a large part of what puts a person at risk
for becoming depressed. For example, immediate family members of a depressed
person have a significantly higher risk of becoming depressed than would an
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average person, and having two parents with a history of depression more than
doubles a person’s risk of becoming depressed. This is because genetics play such
a large part in determining whether someone becomes depressed or not.
Genes are like manufacturing instructions for building our brains and
bodies. As you may know, genes determine how we look, and what kinds of traits
we have. Likewise, certain genes create chemical imbalances in the brain, which
are known as major causes of depression. These genes have even been called
depression genes. Furthermore, genes determine whether or not people become
depressed in response to stressful events. For example, not everybody who gets
mistreated as a child becomes depressed later in life; it is the person’s genetic
makeup that determines whether that person will become depressed in response to
the abuse. Our genes can even influence what environments we end up in, so
some people may find themselves in depressing circumstances because of their
genes.
In recent years, neuroscience has shown us that depression is truly a brain
disorder. Brain imaging has shown that there are real differences between the
brains of depressed people and the brains of non-depressed people. Depressed
people have abnormalities in critical areas of the brain. The area that is involved
in emotional reactions to the environment is over-active; this explains why many
depressed people over-react to stressful situations in their lives. At the same time,
the brain area that is involved in solving problems is under-active, making it
difficult for depressed individuals to think clearly or act effectively to solve their
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problems. The following clip will explain a little bit about the biology of
depression.
[Clip from
http://www.thevisualmd.com/health_centers/neurological_health/depression/what
_is_depression_video]
As you may know, antidepressants are sometimes given to people with
depression. The benefits of these medications, however, tend to be only
temporary; scientific studies have shown that depression frequently comes back
when people stop taking their medication. Once the medication wears off, there is
no longer anything stopping the person's genes from causing chemical imbalances
in the brain, so brain chemistry often returns to the way it was before the person
started taking the medication. Therefore, it is important for depressed people to
continue taking their medication consistently, much like people with diabetes,
high cholesterol, high blood pressure or other chronic illnesses must take their
medication every day. Some scientists believe that psychotherapy—the process
of talking to a professional therapist—is beneficial mainly because it helps
patients make sure they take their medication regularly. Psychotherapy may also
help depressed individuals cope with their symptoms and endure the negative
effects of their disorder. There are also self-help books that can be used for this
purpose. Sometimes, when other treatments are not working, doctors will try
electroconvulsive therapy – sometimes called electric shock therapy -- to treat
depression. This treatment causes a seizure in the brain, and while scientists do
not fully understand how it works, it is known to benefit some very depressed
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individuals. Although no treatment for depression has a 100% success rate, there
are several options that professionals can use when treating a person with this
disease.
Malleable explanation. The script for the malleable explanation video was as
follows:
Hello, I work in the field of clinical psychology as a researcher and
clinician, and I want to thank you for your time today. You just completed a
computer task called the “Reaction Time Test.” The Reaction Time Test is a
recently-developed depression screening test that measures dysfunctional habits
of responding to emotional information, which is an early and highly reliable
marker of depression risk.
Researchers at Mississippi State University are currently developing an
online service that will allow students to log in, take the depression screening test,
and get immediate feedback about their risk of developing depression, based on
their scores. They will also be provided with information to help them reduce
their risk.
After you finished the test, the computer automatically calculated your
score. Your score will now be presented, along with some information to help you
understand what your score means.
If you scored in the Low Risk range, a Low Risk video will play to explain
your score. If you scored in the Moderate Risk range, a Moderate Risk video will
play, and if you scored in the High Risk range, a High Risk video will play.
[voice over as graph is displayed]
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The graph you see now shows your results from the depression screening
test. Your reaction times were much faster when Me-related words were in the
same category with Sad words and Not-Me related words were in the same
category with Happy words. As you can see on the graph, your scores fall in the
High Risk range. Your results indicate that you have developed a habit of
hypersensitive attention toward negative information. Even if you have not
consciously noticed mood problems yet, your test results indicate that you are at
very high risk of becoming depressed in the near future, because you have learned
to process negative emotional information in an over-active way, and this style of
thinking has become automatic over time.
In order to help you understand what your scores mean, some information
about depression will now be presented.
Many people who have symptoms of depression, or know someone who
does, wonder what causes these kinds of problems. The truth is, whether or not a
person becomes depressed depends upon a wide variety of factors. Genetics alone
can never make someone depressed. In fact, even among people who have an
immediate family member with depression, a large majority do not become
depressed themselves. Even if a person has a genetically identical twin with
depression, most of the time that person will not become depressed.
There are many reasons why genes are not the deciding factor in
depression. For example, even if a person has depression-related genes, these
genes may not be active. Like a light switch, genes can be turned on or off.
Research has shown that lifestyle factors like diet, exercise, and levels of stress
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will affect whether or not genes related to depression will actually be turned on.
You could think of genes like the heating system in your house, while other
factors act like the thermostat. The heating system is always there, but it is not
always active—the settings on the thermostat determine whether the heat will be
on or not. Similarly, the genes we are born with are always there, but this does
not mean all of them will always be active or turned on. The following clip, from
the University of Utah’s Genetic Science Learning Center, will explain a little bit
about how genes get turned on and off.
[Clip from video at
http://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/epigenetics/twins]
Some people have heard that depression is caused by a chemical
imbalance in the brain. In reality though, biological tests of brain activity or brain
chemicals cannot even be used to diagnose depression. What’s more, scientists
have found that the brain is constantly changing because of the experiences and
environments we choose. The brain can be compared to a muscle: it grows and
changes according to how it is used or exercised. One way to exercise the brain is
through learning, which can strengthen or change the activity of cells in the brain.
For a depressed person, it can be very helpful to learn new ways of thinking or
interacting with others, sometimes with help from a professional therapist, or the
kinds of self-help books that are widely available
Brain-imaging studies have looked at changes in the brains of people
whose depression improved after learning and practicing these kinds of skills and
have found something remarkable. These people’s patterns of brain activity were
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found to look more like those of people without depression. That is, their brain
activity changed for the better, and because of what they had learned, their
depression improved.
There are many pathways out of depression, and there are many things
that can help people along these paths. For instance, medications are available
that can help reduce or control the symptoms of depression, which can make it
easier to learn the kinds of skills that allow people to be in control of their mood.
Such skills will stay with a person for a long time—just like learning to ride a
bicycle, and many people find that learning them can help keep depression away.
Aerobic exercise and exposure to sunlight have also been shown to change brain
chemistry and activity in a way that helps with feelings of depression. Whatever
might be causing a person’s depression, there are many types of support available
to help deal with it.
Post-Manipulation Questionnaires
After the causal explanation video ended, the computer automatically presented
the remaining self-report measures, with the exception of the demographic and funnel
debriefing questionnaires, and instructed participants to respond using the keyboard. See
Appendix C for the full text of these measures.
Treatment Referrals
After the self-report measures were completed, the computer automatically
presented the treatment referral videos and questions assessing willingness to accept
treatment. The order in which referrals were presented was randomized, with participants
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viewing either the antidepressant or psychotherapy referral first depending on the referral
condition to which they had been randomly assigned.
Debriefing
After participants responded to both treatment referrals, the demographic
questionnaire was automatically administered via computer, followed by the funnel
debriefing questionnaire. See Appendix C for the full text of these measures. Next, the
researcher returned to the room and stated that there would be one last video to watch as
part of the session. The researcher opened the debriefing video, and left the room when it
began to play. See Appendix B for the full script of the debriefing video.
After the debriefing video ended, the researcher returned to the room and
presented the participant with a data use permission form, which they were asked to sign
if they granted permission for their data to be used for research purposes. Finally, item 12
of the QIDS-SR was administered on paper to assess for recent thoughts of death or
suicide. According to IRB-approved procedures, participants were screened for risk and
offered assistance in making an appointment with either the student health center or the
counseling center if they wished to do so before they left the laboratory. All participants
were then given a list of contact information for local and national mental health
resources before being dismissed.
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RESULTS
Participants
Participants were recruited via SONA from the undergraduate subject pool at a
large Southern university, and were awarded 1 hour of course credit in exchange for
participating. Of the 145 participants who completed the study, six were excluded from
analyses for the following reasons: declining to sign data use permission form (2), sound
initially muted on videos (1), listening to music during the experimental session (1),
using phone to video chat during the experimental session (1), previously took a class
taught by PI and stated that this factor influenced desire to participate (1). Thus, a total of
139 participants were included in analyses. Demographic characteristics are presented in
Table 1.
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Table 1
Participant Characteristics (N = 139)
Gender (%)
Female
77.7
Male
21.6
Ethnicity (%)
White non-Hispanic
63.3
Black non-Hispanic
32.4
Hispanic or Latino
1.4
Asian or Pacific
0.7
Islander
Other
2.2
Age
M = 19.77 SD = 1.64
Note. Data on gender was missing for one participant.
Data on age was missing for two participants.
Missing Data and Internal Consistency
A total of 35 values were missing from self-report measures assessing depressive
symptoms, beliefs about causes of depression, emotion and regulation beliefs, prognostic
pessimism, and expectancy and credibility of psychotherapy and antidepressant
medication, which amounted to 0.38% of the self-report data. The greatest amount of data
to be missing from a single participant was three values, amounting to 4.35% of the data
for that individual.
All of the missing self-report data from these measures came from items where
participants were asked to use the keyboard to type in percentages: Item 3 and Item 4 of
the prognostic pessimism scale (three and four missing values, respectively; 1.3% of data
missing from the measure), Item 4 and Item 6 of the credibility and expectancy
questionnaire (CEQ) for antidepressant medication (five and 12 missing values,
respectively; 2.04% of data missing from the measure), and Item 4 and Item 6 of the CEQ
for psychotherapy (four and seven missing values, respectively; 1.32% of data missing
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from the measure). In addition to the missing self-report data, four values were missing
from the measure of willingness to accept treatment with antidepressant medication, and
one value was missing from the measure of willingness to accept psychotherapy.
In order to assess whether the missing values were missing completely at random
(MCAR), Little’s MCAR test was carried out in SPSS v. 24 on all items to be included in
analyses for the present study. Little’s test yielded non-significant results, indicating that
missing values in the present data set are MCAR. Given the low percentage of missing
data and the outcome of Little’s test, missing values from self-report measures were filled
in using mean substitution (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).
The five missing values from the treatment willingness scales all occurred on
items where participants were asked to enter a percentage indicating the likelihood that
they would seek treatment either within a week or in the future if depressive symptoms
increased. Because participants with missing values on these items did respond to the
preceding items on the treatment willingness scales, their scores could be identified
within a two-point range.1 Thus, in these five cases, scores were computed by taking the
mid-point between the two values that might have been assigned if participants had
responded to all of the items validly. For instance, if a participant’s score might have
been either a 5 or 6 but the percent likelihood item was missing, then a score of 5.5 was
entered.

1

For instance, a participant who responded that they did not wish to make an
appointment right away but would “maybe” make an appointment on their own within a
week would score either a 5 or a 6 on the relevant treatment willingness measure,
depending whether or not they rated the probability of doing so above 50%.
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To assess internal consistency, Cronbach’s alphas were calculated. Results
indicated adequate internal consistency for the QIDS-SR sans item 12 (α = .79), the CEQ
for antidepressant medication (α = .89), the CEQ for psychotherapy (α = .85), depression
mind set (α = .89), ERBS Emotional Constraint (α = .80), and ERBS Regulation Worth
(α = .76). Internal consistency for ERBS Hijack (α = .67) and prognostic pessimism (α =
.51) was lower.
Manipulation Checks
After viewing either the fixed biological or malleable explanation video,
participants were asked to rate the likelihood that various factors might cause depressed
mood. Within the fixed biological explanation group (n = 67), the item “recent traumatic
events” exhibited the most extreme skewness (-1.76) and kurtosis (3.56) values. Within
the malleable explanation group (n = 72), “day to day problems or stress” exhibited the
greatest skew (-2.06) and “substance abuse” exhibited the most extreme kurtosis (4.86).
Although somewhat elevated, these skewness and kurtosis values are still within
acceptable limits (Kline, 2010).
In order to assess the efficacy of the causal explanation manipulation in altering
participants’ beliefs about the causes of depression, independent-samples t-tests were
carried out using these ratings as the DVs. Group means and standard deviations for each
of the factors are presented in Table 2. For items where Levene’s test indicated inequality
of variance (i.e., “brain chemistry or biochemical imbalance,” “abnormal brain structure
or development,” “substance abuse”) the degrees of freedom were adjusted accordingly.
Results indicated significant group differences in ratings for “genetics,” t(137) = 7.88, p
< .001, Cohen’s d = 1.35, “brain chemistry or biochemical imbalance,” t(135.82) = 5.94,
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p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.02, “abnormal brain structure or development,” t(134.74) = 6.12,
p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.05, and “brain injury,” t(137) = 3.42, p = .001, Cohen’s d =
0.58.2 As expected, participants who viewed a fixed biological explanation for depression
rated each of these factors as more likely to cause depressed mood than did participants
who viewed a malleable explanation.

2

Given the skewness and kurtosis observed in ratings for some items, Mann-Whitney
tests were also conducted comparing causal explanation groups and yielded similar
results.
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Table 2
Beliefs about the Causes of Depression
Fixed Biological
Explanation
(n = 67)
M
5.46
5.93

SD
1.76
1.51

Malleable
Explanation
(n = 72)
M
2.99
4.26

SD
1.93
1.78

p
<.01
<.01*

Cohen’s
d
1.34
1.01

Genetics
Brain chemistry or
biochemical imbalance
Day to day problems
5.81
1.28
6.04
1.36
.30
.17
or stress
Beliefs or style of
5.19
1.61
5.39
1.77
.50
.12
thinking
Abnormal brain structure
5.87
1.36
4.29
1.67
<.01*
1.04
or development
Brain injury
5.61
1.47
4.71
1.64
<.01
.58
Substance abuse
5.73
1.62
5.97
1.16
.32*
.17
Weakness of character
4.34
2.01
4.75
1.85
.22
.21
Problems from childhood
5.09
1.87
5.42
1.68
.28
.19
or the way you were
raised
Recent traumatic events
5.97
1.38
6.13
1.33
.50
.12
Note. Mean comparisons presented in Table 2 were conducted via independent samples ttests. Mann-Whitney U-tests were also carried out and produced similar results. For items
where Levene’s test indicated unequal variance, degrees of freedom were adjusted for the
significance tests reported in Table 2 and p-values are marked with an asterisk.
Prior to watching the debriefing video, participants completed a funneled
debriefing questionnaire that included the yes/no question: “Did you have doubts about
any part of the study?” Over half of participants (56.8% of full sample; 58.2% in the
fixed biological explanation condition, 55.6% in the malleable explanation condition)
reported having no doubts about any part of the study. Percentages of participants who
expressed doubts within each combination of causal explanation and referral type are
presented in Table 3.
38

Table 3
Participants Grouped by Explanation Condition and Treatment Referral Type
Referral type

Fixed Biological Explanation
Medication
Psychotherapy
(n = 34)
(n = 33)

Malleable Explanation
Medication
Psychotherapy
(n = 31)
(n = 41)

M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
Treatment
3.97 2.67
4.47
2.64
3.63 2.69
5.02
2.82
willingness
Depressive
7.65 4.68
6.88
5.01
6.48 3.62
8.32
4.16
symptoms
Treatment
history (%)
Yes
47.1
39.4
16.1
36.6
No
52.9
60.6
83.9
63.4
Doubts (%)
Yes
38.2
45.5
45.2
43.9
No
61.8
54.5
54.8
56.1
Note. Treatment willingness = willingness to accept initial treatment referral; Depressive
symptoms = Quick Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology – Self Report sans item 12;
Treatment history = current or past psychotherapy or use of prescribed medications to
treat psychological symptoms; Doubts = response to question “Did you have doubts
about any part of the study?”
Of those who did report having doubts, almost all focused on the accuracy or
validity of the depression screening test results (e.g., “I feel my reaction time results
overestimated my depression risk,” “I doubt that I have depression,” “I am still a little bit
confused about how reaction time can relate to someone’s depression”). No participants
indicated any suspicion that the “depression screening test” (that is, the IAT) had been
part of a cover story or that the study had involved deception at any point, nor did anyone
correctly identify the true purpose of the study. Thus, it is possible that participants still
accepted the information about depression in general and its causes as accurate, even if
they had doubts about the depression screening test and bogus test results. In order to
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quantitatively assess this possibility, the independent samples t-tests using explanation
condition as the IV and ratings about the likelihood of factors causing depression as the
DVs were repeated with only those participants (n = 60) who reported doubts about the
study. Results still indicated significant differences between explanation conditions, with
the fixed biological condition giving higher ratings for “genetics,” t(58) = 3.69, p <.01,
Cohen’s d = 0.97, “brain chemistry or biochemical imbalance,” t(58) = 2.35, p = .02,
Cohen’s d = 0.62, and “abnormal brain structure or development,” t(58) = 2.31, p = .03,
Cohen’s d = 0.61, though not for “brain injury,” t(58) = 1.01, p = .32, Cohen’s d = 0.27.
In addition, two other factors were now significant with the malleable condition giving
higher ratings: “day to day problems or stress,” t(58) = 2.18, p = .03, Cohen’s d = 0.57,
and “beliefs or style of thinking,” t(58) = 2.42, p = .02, Cohen’s d = 0.64.
Taken together, these results indicate that participants who expressed doubts
about the study were still swayed by the causal explanations for depression, albeit to a
lesser degree with regard to biological factors than those who had no doubts.
Nonetheless, in order to assess whether credulity belief with regard to the potential cause
of depression influenced the effect of the experimental manipulation, hypothesis tests
were carried out both with and without the binary doubts variable included as a factor.
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Hypothesis 1
Preliminary Analyses
Participants were grouped according to explanation condition (i.e., whether a
participant viewed the fixed biological or malleable explanation for depression) and
initial treatment referral (i.e., whether a participant was initially referred to the student
health center for antidepressant medication or the student counseling center for
psychotherapy). This yielded four cells: fixed/antidepressant referral (n = 34),
fixed/psychotherapy referral (n = 33), malleable/antidepressant referral (n = 31), and
malleable/psychotherapy referral (n = 41).
For each cell, skewness and kurtosis statistics for the initial treatment willingness
scale3 were computed. Skewness values ranged from .748 to .989 and kurtosis ranged
from .401 to .864, all of which fell within acceptable limits (Kline, 2010). The variance
ratio between the largest cell variance and smallest was 1.14, indicating that the variance
in treatment willingness was sufficiently similar across cells (Field, 2013).
Main Analyses
Hypothesis 1, that the effect of causal explanation on willingness to accept
treatment would differ based on type of treatment referral, was tested using a 2 x 2
factorial ANOVA. Causal explanation (fixed or malleable) and type of treatment referral
(antidepressant medication or psychotherapy) were included as independent variables
(IVs) and willingness to accept treatment served as the dependent variable (DV). Means
and standard deviations for each cell are presented in Table 3.

3

That is, the scale corresponding to whichever treatment option was presented first.
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There was a significant main effect of type of treatment referral on willingness to
accept treatment, F(1, 135) = 4.20, p = .04, partial η2 = .03. Examination of marginal
means indicates that participants referred to the counseling center for psychotherapy were
more willing to accept the referral than were those referred to the student health center
for antidepressant medication. The interaction of causal explanation and treatment
referral was non-significant, F(1, 135) = .94, p = .33, partial η2 = .01. Thus, Hypothesis 1
was not supported, as no main effects were predicted and a significant interaction was
predicted.
Hypothesis 2
Preliminary Analyses
Participants were grouped according to explanation condition, yielding two
groups: fixed biological explanation (n = 67), and malleable explanation (n = 72).
Assumption checks were then carried out on within-subject differences between
treatment expectancies for antidepressant medication and for psychotherapy. Skewness (.786 and .283, respectively) and kurtosis (.245 and -.205, respectively) values all fell
within acceptable limits (Kline, 2010). The variance ratio between the largest cell
variance and smallest was 1.11, indicating sufficient equality of variance (Field, 2013).
Main Analyses
Hypothesis 2, that participants given a fixed biological explanation for depression
would report lower perceived credibility and effectiveness for psychotherapy and higher
perceived credibility and effectiveness for antidepressant medication than those given a
malleable explanation, was tested using a mixed-design ANOVA. Causal explanation
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(fixed or malleable) served as the between-subjects variable and type of treatment (CEQ
for psychotherapy and CEQ for antidepressant medication) as the within-subjects
variable. Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 4.
Table 4
Variable Means in Fixed Biological and Malleable Explanation Conditions
Fixed Biological
Malleable
Explanation
Explanation
(n = 67)
(n = 72)
Variable
M
SD
M
SD
p
Cohen’s d
CEQ antidepressant
37.54
9.83
33.69
8.40
.01
.42
medication
CEQ psychotherapy
37.33
8.61
36.50
8.34
.56
.10
Prognostic pessimism
18.94
4.71
18.60
4.27
.65
.08
ERBS Emotional
22.45
6.65
24.26
5.97
.09
.29
Constraint
Item-level mean
2.49
2.70
ERBS Regulation
26.85
4.75
27.78
3.92
.21
.21
Worth
Item-level mean
3.84
3.97
ERBS Hijack
15.55
3.42
16.85
3.56
.03
.37
Item-level mean
3.11
3.37
Depression mind set
9.39
4.51
8.10
4.46
.09
.29
Note. Mean comparisons were carried out via independent samples t-tests; ERBS
Emotional Constraint = Emotion and Regulation Beliefs Scale, Emotional Constraint
subscale; ERBS Regulation Worth = Emotion and Regulation Beliefs Scale, Regulation
Worth subscale; ERBS Hijack = Emotion and Regulation Beliefs Scale, Hijack subscale;
CEQ antidepressant = Credibility and Expectancy Questionnaire, antidepressant
medication; CEQ psychotherapy = Credibility and Expectancy Questionnaire,
psychotherapy.
The main effect of causal explanation approached significance, F(1, 137) = 3.70,
p = .06, partial η2 = .03. Examination of marginal means revealed that among
participants given a fixed biological explanation for depression CEQ ratings for
psychotherapy (M = 37.33, SD = 8.61) and for antidepressant medication (M = 37.54, SD
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= 9.83) were similar, whereas among participants given a malleable explanation CEQ
ratings for psychotherapy (M = 36.50, SD = 8.34) were higher than those for
antidepressant medication (M = 33.69, SD = 8.40). However, the interaction of causal
explanation and treatment type was non-significant, F(1, 137) = 3.00, p = .09, partial η2 =
.02.
To better understand the main effect, paired-samples t-tests were carried out
examining the simple effects of treatment type within each level of causal explanation.
Results indicated that within the malleable explanation group, participants rated
psychotherapy as significantly more credible and more effective for treating depression
than antidepressant medication, t(71) = 2.38, p = .02, Cohen’s d = .34. Within the fixed
biological explanation group, no significant differences between treatment types were
observed. Further, examination of the marginal means showed that CEQ ratings for
antidepressant medication among participants given a malleable explanation were lower
than CEQ ratings for either treatment type among participants given a fixed biological
explanation (see Table 4 for marginal means, SDs, and results of independent samples ttests comparing CEQ ratings for the fixed biological and malleable groups). Thus,
Hypothesis 2 was partially supported.
Hypothesis 3
Preliminary Analyses
Participants were again grouped into fixed biological explanation (n = 67) and
malleable explanation (n = 72) conditions, and assumption checks were carried out on the
prognostic pessimism scale. Skewness (.427 and .459, respectively) and kurtosis (1.19
and .178, respectively) values fell within acceptable limits (Kline, 2010). The variance
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ratio between the largest cell variance and smallest was 1.26, indicating sufficient
equality of variance (Field, 2013).
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Main Analyses
Hypothesis 3, that participants given a fixed biological explanation for depression
would exhibit greater prognostic pessimism than those given a malleable explanation,
was tested using an independent samples t-test, with causal explanation (fixed or
malleable) as the IV and prognostic pessimism as the DV. Means and standard deviations
are presented in Table 4. Results of this test were non-significant, t(137) = .45, p = .65,
Cohen’s d = .08, indicating no difference in prognostic pessimism between the two causal
explanation conditions. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was not supported.
Hypothesis 4
Preliminary Analyses
Assumption checks were carried out on the ERBS Emotion Constraint subscale
for the fixed (n = 67) and malleable (n = 72) explanation conditions. Skewness (.381 and
.854, respectively) and kurtosis (-.140 and 1.14, respectively) fell within acceptable limits
(Kline, 2010) and the variance ratio was 1.24, indicating sufficient equality of variance.
Main Analyses
Hypothesis 4, that participants given a fixed biological explanation for depression
would endorse stronger belief that people are constrained by emotions than those given a
malleable explanation, was tested using an independent samples t-test, with causal
explanation (fixed or malleable) as the independent variable and the Emotion Constraint
subscale of the ERBS as the dependent variable. Means and standard deviations are
presented in Table 4. Results indicated that the effect of causal explanation on
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endorsement of emotion constraint beliefs was not significant, t(137) = -1.70. p = .09,
Cohen’s d = .29. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was not supported.
Exploratory Analyses
Current Depressive Symptoms and Willingness to Accept Treatment
In order to examine whether current depressive symptoms had an impact on
participants’ willingness to accept treatment referrals, a 2 x 2 ANCOVA was conducted.
Causal explanation (fixed or malleable) and type of treatment referral (antidepressant
medication or psychotherapy) were included as IVs, current depressive symptoms
(QIDS-SR sans item 12) served as a covariate, and willingness to accept treatment served
as the DV.
Results showed a significant main effect of current depressive symptoms, F(1,
135) = 10.68, p < .01, partial η2 = .07, indicating that participants reporting higher levels
of depressive symptoms were more willing to accept treatment referrals. In addition, the
main effect of referral type approached significance, F(1, 135) = 3.68, p = .06, partial η2
= .03, suggesting that participants may have been more willing to accept referrals for
psychotherapy than for medication even when adjusting for current depressive symptoms.
No other significant main effects or interactions emerged.
Treatment History and Willingness to Accept Treatment
The demographic questionnaire used in the present study included questions about
current or past psychotherapy, as well as current or past use of prescribed medications to
treat psychological symptoms such as depression or anxiety. Responses to these questions
were used to create a binary treatment history variable, categorizing participants on the
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basis of whether or not they had ever received treatment (i.e., psychotherapy or
medication) for psychological symptoms. From the full sample, 49 participants reported
some history of treatment, whereas 90 participants reported no current or past
psychotherapy or medication for psychological symptoms.
In order to examine whether treatment history had an impact on participants’
willingness to accept treatment referrals, a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted. Causal
explanation (fixed or malleable), type of treatment referral (antidepressant medication or
psychotherapy), and treatment history (current or past treatment or no treatment history)
were included as IVs, and willingness to accept treatment served as the DV. Results
showed a significant main effect of treatment history, F(1, 131) = 6.83, p = .01, partial η2
= .05, indicating that participants with current or previous experience with treatment for
psychological symptoms showed greater willingness to accept treatment referrals in the
present study. However, the main effect of treatment referral condition was no longer
significant, F(1, 131) = 2.21, p = .14, partial η2 = .02. No other significant main effects
and no significant interactions emerged.
Credulity and Willingness to Accept Treatment
Given that 43.2% of participants endorsed having doubts about the study—
specifically, pertaining to the accuracy or validity of the depression screening test—while
the other 56.8% reported no doubts, we wanted to examine whether participants’
credulity toward the study moderated the impact of the experimental manipulation on
willingness to accept treatment. A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted to test this
possibility. Causal explanation (fixed or malleable), type of treatment referral
(antidepressant medication or psychotherapy), and doubts (yes or no) were included as
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IVs, and willingness to accept treatment served as the DV. Results are presented in Table
5.
Table 5
2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA Comparing Willingness to Accept Treatment across Treatment Referral
Type, Causal Explanation Condition, and Binary Doubts Variable
Source

df

SS

MS

F

p

partial η2

Explanation condition
1
1.46
1.46
0.21
<.01
<.01
Referral type
1
34.44
34.44
5.01
.01
.04
Doubts
1
30.23
30.23
4.39
.04
.03
Referral type x
1
9.46
9.46
1.37
.24
.01
explanation condition
Referral type x doubts
1
2.36
2.36
0.34
.56
<.01
Explanation condition x
1
17.39
17.39
2.53
.11
.02
doubts
Referral type x
1
41.31
41.31
6.00
.02
.04
explanation condition
x doubts
Error
131
901.39
6.88
Total
139
3630.00
Note. Dependent variable: willingness to accept treatment; df = degrees of freedom; SS =
type III sum of squares; MS = mean square; Doubts = response to question “Did you have
doubts about any part of the study?”
Consistent with the results from the original test of Hypothesis 1, there was a
significant main effect of type of treatment referral on willingness to accept treatment,
F(1, 131) = 5.01, p = .03, partial η2 = .04, with participants referred for psychotherapy
showing greater willingness to accept the referral than those referred for antidepressant
medication. There was also a significant main effect of the binary doubts variable, F(1,
131) = 4.39, p = .04, partial η2 = .03, with participants who reported no doubts about the
study exhibiting greater willingness to accept treatment. Notably, the 3-way interaction of
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explanation condition, referral type, and doubts was also significant, F(1, 131) = 6.00, p
= .02, partial η2 = .04.
As a means of probing the significant 3-way interaction, separate 2 x 2 ANOVAS
were conducted within each level of the binary doubts variable, with explanation
condition and referral type as IVs and treatment willingness as the DV. Results are
presented in Table 6. Among participants who reported no doubts about the study (n =
79), no significant main effects or interactions emerged. However, among participants
who reported having doubts about the study (n = 60), the main effect of referral type
approached significance, F(1, 56) = 3.93, p = .05, partial η2 = .07, and there was a
significant 2-way interaction of explanation condition and referral type, F(1, 56) = 6.47, p
= .01, partial η2 = .10.
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51

1
1
1

Explanation
condition

Referral type

Referral type x
explanation
condition
Error
557.69

6.51

10.87

5.09

SS

7.44

6.51

10.87

5.09

MS

0.88

1.46

0.68

F

.35

.23

.41

p

.01

.02

.01

partial
η2

56

1

1

1

df

343.71

39.72

24.12

12.72

SS

6.14

39.72

24.12

12.72

MS

6.47

3.93

2.07

F

Doubts = Yes (n = 60)

.01

.05

.16

p

.10

.06

.04

partial
η2

Total
79
2302.50
60
1327.50
Note. Dependent variable: willingness to accept treatment; df = degrees of freedom; SS = type III sum of squares; MS = mean
square; Doubts = response to question “Did you have doubts about any part of the study?”

75

df

Source

Doubts = No (n = 79)

Separate 2 x 2 ANOVAs Comparing Willingness to Accept Treatment across Treatment Referral Type and Causal Explanation
Condition in Participants With and Without Doubts

Table 6

Examination of marginal means indicated that among participants who responded
“yes” to the doubts question, those who viewed the malleable explanation for depression
were more willing to accept a referral for psychotherapy than were those who viewed the
fixed biological explanation, whereas mean scores for treatment willingness in those
referred for antidepressant medication were similar across causal explanation conditions
(Figure 1). To test the simple effect of causal explanation within participants who
received psychotherapy referrals and reported having doubts about the study, an
independent samples t-test was conducted with causal explanation as the IV and
willingness to accept treatment as the DV. Results showed a large effect, t(32) = 2.92, p =
.01, Cohen’s d = 1.04.
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Figure 1.
Mean levels of willingness to accept treatment within each combination of
causal explanation for depression and treatment referral type, for participants for reported
no doubts about the study (top) and those who did report doubts (bottom).
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In order to rule out the possibility that the observed interaction of causal
explanation, referral type, and doubts was an artifact of differences in depressive
symptoms across cells, we repeated the 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with causal explanation (fixed
or malleable), type of treatment referral (antidepressant medication or psychotherapy),
and doubts (yes or no) as IVs, but this time with current depression symptoms serving as
the DV. Results are presented in Table 7. In this case, the 3-way interaction was not
significant, F(1, 131) = 1.03, p = .31, partial η2 = .01. This outcome serves as evidence
against the possibility that the 3-way interaction predicting treatment willingness is
merely an artifact of differences in depressive symptoms.
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Table 7
2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA Comparing Current Depressive Symptoms across Treatment Referral
Type, Causal Explanation Condition, and Binary Doubts Variable
p

partial η2

0.11
0.52
6.13
3.10

.74
.47
.02
.08

<.01
<.01
.05
.02

19.74

1.05

.31

.01

6.43
19.29

0.34
1.03

.56
.31

<.01
.01

Source

df

SS

MS

Explanation condition
Referral type
Doubts
Referral type x
explanation condition
Explanation condition x
doubts
Referral type x doubts
Referral type x
explanation condition
x doubts
Error
Total

1
1
1
1

2.11
9.81
115.00
58.07

2.11
9.81
115.00
58.07

1

19.74

1
1

6.43
19.29

F

131
2455.84
18.75
139
10301.00
Note. Dependent variable: Quick Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology – Self Report
sans item 12; df = degrees of freedom; SS = type III sum of squares; MS = mean square;
Doubts = response to question “Did you have doubts about any part of the study?”
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However, in the analyses with treatment willingness as the DV we saw the
significant explanation condition by referral type interaction specifically within the group
of participants who reported having doubts about the study. As a means of assessing
evidence for an artifactual explanation at this level, separate 2 x 2 ANOVAS were
conducted within each level of the binary doubts variable, with explanation condition and
referral type as IVs, but now with depression scores serving as the DV. Results are
presented in Table 8. The 2-way interaction neared significance among participants who
reported having doubts, n = 60, F(1, 56) = 3.97, p = .05, partial η2 = .07, and the
marginal means of depression within each combination of causal explanation and referral
type (Figure 2) bore some similarity to the corresponding values for treatment willingness
within each cell (Figure 1). However, the effect size for the 2-way interaction of
explanation condition and referral type with treatment willingness as the DV was 58%
larger than the effect size with depression scores as the DV.
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df

SS

MS

F

p

partial
η2
df

SS

MS

F

Doubts = Yes (n = 60)
p

partial
η2

Explanation
1
5.18
5.18 0.25 .62
<.01
1
15.29 15.29
0.96 .33
.02
condition
Referral type
1
18.60 18.60 0.89 .35
.01
1
0.16
0.16
0.01 .92
<.01
Referral type x
1
6.04
6.04 0.29 .59
<.01
1
63.46 63.46
3.97 .05
.07
explanation
condition
Error
75
1560.50 20.81
56
895.34
15.99
Total
79
6887.00
60
3414.00
Note. Dependent variable: Quick Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology – Self Report sans item 12; df = degrees of
freedom; SS = type III sum of squares; MS = mean square; Doubts = response to question “Did you have doubts about any part
of the study?”

Source

Doubts = No (n = 79)

Separate 2 x 2 ANOVAs Comparing Current Depressive Symptoms across Treatment Referral Type and Causal Explanation
Condition in Participants With and Without Doubts

Table 8

Figure 2.
Mean levels of depressive symptoms within each combination of causal
explanation for depression and treatment referral type, for participants for reported no
doubts about the study (top) and those who did report doubts (bottom).
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Finally, the original 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA and subsequent pair of 2 x 2 ANOVAs
within each level of the doubt variable with willingness to accept treatment as the DV
were repeated, but this time depression scores were included as a covariate. After
adjusting for current depressive symptoms, the 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA still yielded a
significant 3-way interaction of explanation condition, referral type, and doubts, F(1,
130) = 5.11, p = .03, partial η2 = .04 (Table 9). In addition, the 2 x 2 ANOVA within
those participants who reported having doubts (n = 60) still yielded a significant 2-way
interaction of explanation condition and referral type after adjusting for current
depressive symptoms, F(1, 55) = 4.57, p = .04, partial η2 = .08 (Table 10). Thus,
depression was not confounded with this interaction.
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Table 9
2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA Comparing Willingness to Accept Treatment across Treatment Referral
Type, Causal Explanation Condition, and Binary Doubts Variable when Adjusting for
Current Depressive Symptoms
Source
df
SS
MS
F
p
partial η2
Depressive symptoms
1
47.38
47.38
7.21
.01
.05
Explanation condition
1
1.01
1.01
0.15
.70
<.01
Referral type
1
29.41
29.41
4.48
.04
.03
Doubts
1
15.35
15.35
2.34
.13
.02
Referral type x
1
3.97
3.97
0.61
.44
.01
explanation condition
Explanation condition x
1
12.52
12.52
1.91
.17
.01
doubts
Referral type x doubts
1
3.56
3.56
0.54
.46
<.01
Referral type x
1
33.58
33.58
5.11
.03
.04
explanation condition
x doubts
Error
130
854.01
6.57
Total
139
3630.00
Note. Dependent variable: willingness to accept treatment; Depressive symptoms = Quick
Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology – Self Report sans item 12; df = degrees of
freedom; SS = type III sum of squares; MS = mean square; Doubts = response to question
“Did you have doubts about any part of the study?”

60

61

1

df
38.50

SS
38.50

MS
5.49

F
.02

p
.07

partial
η2
1

df
10.30

SS
10.30

MS

1.70

F

p
.20

Doubts = Yes (n = 60)

.03

partial
η2

Explanation
1
3.59
3.59
0.51 .48
.01
1
9.74
9.74
1.61 .21
.03
condition
Referral type
1
6.78
6.78
0.97 .33
.01
1
23.71
23.71
3.91 .05
.07
Referral type x
1
8.60
8.60
1.23 .27
.02
1
27.72
27.72
4.57 .04
.08
explanation
condition
Error
74
519.19
7.02
55
Total
79
2302.50
60
Note. Dependent variable: willingness to accept treatment; Depressive symptoms = Quick Inventory of Depressive
Symptomatology – Self Report sans item 12; df = degrees of freedom; SS = type III sum of squares; MS = mean square; Doubts
= response to question “Did you have doubts about any part of the study?

Depressive
symptoms

Source

Doubts = No (n = 79)

Separate 2 x 2 ANOVAs Comparing Willingness to Accept Treatment across Treatment Referral Type and Causal Explanation
Condition in Participants With and Without Doubts When Adjusting for Current Depressive Symptoms

Table 10

Credulity and Perceived Credibility and Effectiveness of Treatments
A mixed ANOVA was carried out with explanation condition (fixed biological or
malleable) and doubts about the study (yes or no) as between-subjects IVs, CEQ
treatment modality (antidepressant medication or psychotherapy) as the within subjects
IV, and CEQ scores as the DV.
Results were largely consistent with those obtained in the original test of
Hypothesis 2, before the addition of the binary doubts variable. Again, the main effect of
causal explanation approached significance, F(1, 135) = 3.29, p = .07, partial η2 = .02,
whereas the main effect of doubts was not significant despite yielding a similar effect
size, F(1, 135) = 2.50, p = .12, partial η2 = .02. Again, examination of marginal means
(see Table 11 for means and SDs) showed that among participants given a fixed
biological explanation for depression, CEQ ratings for psychotherapy and for
antidepressant medication were similar, whereas among participants given a malleable
explanation CEQ ratings for psychotherapy were higher than those for antidepressant
medication. However, the 2-way interaction of causal explanation and CEQ treatment
type did not reach significance, F(1, 135) = 3.14, p = .08, partial η2 = .02. The 3-way
interaction of explanation condition, CEQ treatment type, and the binary doubts variable
was also non-significant, F(1, 135) = 0.23, p = .63, partial η2 < .01.
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Variable Means in Fixed Biological and Malleable Explanation Conditions for Participants With and Without Doubts
Doubts = No
Doubts = Yes
Fixed Biological
Malleable
Fixed Biological
Malleable
Referral type
(n = 39)
(n = 40)
(n = 28)
(n = 32)
Variable
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD
CEQ antidepressant
38.31
9.74
34.48
8.15
36.46
10.03
32.72
8.73
CEQ psychotherapy
38.56
9.20
37.03
8.47
35.61
7.53
35.84
8.26
Prognostic pessimism
19.49
4.51
18.03
4.24
18.18
4.97
19.31
4.26
ERBS Emotional Constraint
23.84
7.16
24.80
6.40
20.50
5.41
23.59
5.40
ERBS Regulation Worth
26.74
4.43
28.23
3.58
27.00
5.24
27.22
4.29
ERBS Hijack
15.80
3.80
17.45
3.10
15.21
2.85
16.09
4.00
Depression mind set
10.74
4.75
8.90
5.05
7.50
3.41
7.09
3.42
Note. ERBS Emotional Constraint = Emotion and Regulation Beliefs Scale, Emotional Constraint subscale; ERBS Regulation
Worth = Emotion and Regulation Beliefs Scale, Regulation Worth subscale; ERBS Hijack = Emotion and Regulation Beliefs
Scale, Hijack subscale; CEQ antidepressant = Credibility and Expectancy Questionnaire, antidepressant medication; CEQ
psychotherapy = Credibility and Expectancy Questionnaire, psychotherapy; Doubts = response to question “Did you have
doubts about any part of the study?”

Table 11

Credulity and Prognostic Pessimism
A 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted with causal explanation (fixed or malleable) and
response to the binary doubts question (yes or no) as IVs and prognostic pessimism as the
DV. Neither the main effect of causal explanation, F(1, 135) = 0.05, p = .83, partial η2 <
.01 nor the main effect of doubts, F(1, 135) < 0.01, p = .99, partial η2 < .01 approached
significance. The 2-way interaction was also non-significant, F(1, 135) = 2.86, p = .09,
partial η2 = .02, though examination of marginal means (see Table 11 for means and SDs)
showed that within the fixed biological explanation condition participants who had no
doubts about the study exhibited more prognostic pessimism than those who reported
having doubts, whereas in the malleable explanation condition the pattern was reversed,
and participants who reported having doubts about the study exhibited more prognostic
pessimism than those who had no doubts.
Causal Explanation and ERBS Subscales
Independent samples t-tests were carried out to examine whether causal
explanation for depression (fixed or malleable) had an impact on the remaining ERBS
subscales. The ERBS Regulation Worth subscale measures belief that it is both valuable
and possible to learn to regulate one’s emotions, whereas the ERBS Hijack subscale
measures belief that strong emotions can take over and make a person lose control over
his or her actions. Participants were grouped by explanation condition and assumption
checks were carried out on ERBS Regulation Worth (skewness = -.60 and kurtosis = -.05
in the fixed biological condition; skewness = -.27 and kurtosis = -.27 in the malleable
condition) and on ERBS Hijack (skewness = .23 and kurtosis = -.13 in the fixed
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biological condition; skewness = -.18 and kurtosis = 1.10 in the malleable condition). All
values fell within acceptable limits (Kline, 2010). The variance ratios between the two
conditions were 1.47 for ERBS Regulation Worth and 1.70 for ERBS Hijack, indicating
sufficient equality of variance (Field, 2013).
Means and standard deviations for each explanation condition are presented in
Table 4. For ERBS Regulation Worth results were not significant, t(1, 137) = -1.26, p =
.21, Cohen’s d = .21. However, the two conditions did differ significantly on the ERBS
Hijack subscale, t(1, 137) = -2.18, p = .03, Cohen’s d = .37. Participants who heard the
malleable explanation for depression reported stronger emotional hijack beliefs than did
participants who heard the fixed biological explanation.
Credulity and ERBS Subscales
To examine whether or not participants’ credulity with regard to the study altered
the impact of causal explanations for depression on beliefs about emotion and its
regulation, a series of 2 x 2 ANOVAs were carried out with explanation condition (fixed
biological or malleable) and response to the binary doubts question (yes or no) as IVs and
each of the ERBS subscales, in turn, as the DV. For the ERBS Emotional Constraint
subscale, the main effect of causal explanation approached significance, F(1, 135) = 3.59,
p = .06, partial η2 = .03, with participants who viewed the malleable explanation for
depression endorsing stronger emotional constraint beliefs than participants who viewed
the fixed biological explanation (see Table 11 for means and SDs). In addition, the main
effect of doubts was significant, F(1, 135) = 4.54, p = .04, partial η2 = .03, with
participants who denied any doubts about the study endorsing stronger emotional
constraint beliefs than those who reported having doubts.
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For the ERBS Regulation Worth subscale neither the main effect of causal
explanation, F(1, 135) = 1.30, p = .26, partial η2 = .01, nor the main effect of doubts, F(1,
135) = 0.25, p = .06, partial η2 < .01, reached significance. The 2-way interaction was
also non-significant, F(1, 135) = 0.72, p = .40, partial η2 = .01.
For the ERBS Hijack subscale, the main effect of causal explanation was
significant, F(1, 135) = 4.51, p = .04, partial η2 = .03, with participants who viewed the
malleable explanation for depression endorsing stronger hijack beliefs than participants
who viewed the fixed biological explanation (see Table 11 for means and SDs). Neither
the main effect of doubts, F(1, 135) = 2.63, p = .12, partial η2 = .02, nor the 2-way
interaction, F(1, 135) = 0.42, p = .52, partial η2 < .01, were significant. Thus, the addition
of the binary doubts variable as a factor in analyses testing the effects of causal
explanation on ERBS subscales yielded results consistent with those that emerged before
the doubts variable was included.
Causal Explanation and Depression Mind Set
Next, we tested the impact of causal explanation condition on participants’ mind
set regarding depression. Higher scores on the Depression Mind Set scale indicate
stronger entity beliefs—that is, a belief that people have a set “amount” of depression that
cannot be changed.
Skewness (.737 in the fixed biological condition and 1.22 in the malleable
condition) and kurtosis (.552 in the fixed biological condition and 1.42 in the malleable
condition) fell within acceptable limits (Kline, 2010). The variance ratio was 1.02,
indicating equality of variance (Field, 2013). Means and standard deviations are
presented in Table 4. An independent samples t-test was conducted with causal
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explanation as the IV and Depression Mind Set as the DV. Results were non-significant,
t(1, 137) = 1.70, p = .09, Cohen’s d = .29.
Credulity and Depression Mind Set
A 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted with causal explanation (fixed or malleable) and
response to the binary doubts question (yes or no) as IVs and the Depression Mind Set
scale as the DV. Results showed a significant main effect of doubts, F(1, 135) = 11.59, p
< .01, partial η2 = .08, with participants who had no doubts about the study endorsing
stronger depression entity beliefs than those who reported having doubts. Neither the
main effect of causal explanation, F(1, 135) = 2.30, p = .13, partial η2 = .02, nor the 2way interaction, F(1, 135) = 0.94, p = .33, partial η2 < .01, reached significance. Means
and SDs are presented in Table 11.
Correlations within Each Explanation Condition
In order to better understand the relationships among variables within each causal
explanation condition, we computed separate bivariate correlation matrices for the fixed
biological explanation and malleable explanation groups. Results are presented in Table
12. In both the fixed biological and malleable explanation groups, higher levels of current
depressive symptoms were associated with stronger depression entity beliefs as measured
by the Depression Mind Set scale, r(65) = .36, p < .01, and r(70) = .29, p = .01,
respectively, as well as poorer perceived prognosis r(65) = .25, p = .04 and r(70) = .32, p
= .01, respectively. Both groups also evidenced positive associations between ERBS
Emotional Constraint and ERBS Hijack beliefs, and between credibility and expectancy
ratings for antidepressants and psychotherapy, as measured by the two CEQ scales.
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7
.28*
.15
.49**
.16
.56**
.14
.02
-.01
.19

8
.20
-.10
-.18
-.17
.04
.24
.001
.29*
.11

9
-.02
-.02
-.26*
-.03
.04
.10
-.11
.35**
.07

10
.31*
.28*
.36**
.14
.25*
-.03
.08
.09
.17
-

Note. Pearson’s correlations within the fixed biological explanation group (n = 67) appear above the diagonal, and those within
the malleable explanation group (n = 72) appear below the diagonal; Treatment willingness = willingness to accept initial
treatment referral; Depressive symptoms = Quick Inventory of Depressive Symptoms - Self Report, sans item 12; Emotional
Constraint = Emotion and Regulation Beliefs Scale, Emotional Constraint subscale; Regulation Worth = Emotion and
Regulation Beliefs Scale, Regulation Worth subscale; Hijack = Emotion and Regulation Beliefs Scale, Hijack subscale; CEQ
antidepressant = Credibility and Expectancy Questionnaire, antidepressant medication; CEQ psychotherapy = Credibility and
Expectancy Questionnaire, psychotherapy; Doubts = response to question “Did you have doubts about any part of the study?”
*p < .05, **p < .01

Bivariate Correlations between Variables within Each Causal Explanation Condition
Variable
1
2
3
4
5
6
1. Treatment willingness
.20
.23
.10
.20
.09
2. Depressive symptoms .38**
.36**
.25*
.23
.01
3. Depression mind set
.05
.29*
.33**
.50**
-.28*
4. Prognostic pessimism
.07
.32*
.06
.10
.10
5. Emotional Constraint -.06
.09
.16
.14
.10
6. Regulation Worth
.07
.06
.10
.04
.21
7. Hijack
-.16
.12
.20
.04
.59**
.40**
8. CEQ antidepressant
.22
.01
-.14
.01
.05
.26*
9. CEQ psychotherapy
.18
-.05
-.08
.11
-.06
.08
10. Doubts
.01
.13
.20
-.15
.10
.13

Table 12

In the fixed biological group, stronger entity beliefs about depression were
associated with poorer perceived prognosis, r(65) = .33, p = .01, and lower credibility and
expectancy ratings for psychotherapy, r(65) = -.26, p = .04. These variables were not
significantly related within the malleable group. Within the malleable group ERBS
Hijack was positively associated with ERBS Regulation Worth, r(70) = .40, p < .001.
These variables were not significantly related within the fixed biological group.
In addition, the two groups exhibited differential relationships between depression
entity beliefs and the ERBS subscales. Among participants who heard the fixed
biological explanation (n = 67), depression entity beliefs were negatively associated with
ERBS Regulation Worth, r(65) = -.28, p = .02, and positively associated with ERBS
Emotional Constraint, r(65) = .50, p < .001, and ERBS Hijack, r(65) = .49, p < .001.
Conversely, among participants who heard the malleable explanation (n = 72) depression
entity beliefs were not significantly related to ERBS Regulation Worth, r(70) = .10, p =
.39, ERBS Emotional Constraint, r(70) = .16, p = .19, or ERBS Hijack, r(70) = .20, p =
.10. The difference between correlations when comparing them across the two
explanation conditions was statistically significant as determined using Fisher’s Ztransformation for ERBS Regulation Worth Z = -2.24, p = .03, ERBS Emotional
Constraint Z = 2.24, p = .03, and ERBS Hijack, Z = 1.92, p = .05.
When participants were grouped according to both referral type and causal
explanation condition (i.e., into four cells), differential relationships emerged between
willingness to accept treatment and other variables measured (Table 13). In both cells of
participants referred for antidepressant medication, CEQ antidepressant scores were
positively related to willingness to accept treatment (both r’s = .32). Because these two
69

cells independently showed medium-sized effects in the same direction, the effect was
examined at the level of referral type combining both causal explanation conditions. In
this case the relationship between CEQ antidepressant scores and treatment willingness
was significant for participants who received medication referrals, r(63) = .32, p = .01. In
both cells of participants given the fixed biological explanation for depression, ERBS
Hijack was positively associated with willingness to accept treatment (both rs = .28).
When the effect was examined at the level of explanation condition by combining both
referral types, the resulting relationship between ERBS Hijack and treatment willingness
was significant among participants who heard the fixed biological explanation, r(65) =
.28, p = .02.
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Bivariate Correlations with Treatment Willingness within Each Combination of Causal Explanation and Referral Condition
Fixed Biological Explanation
Malleable Explanation
Referral type
Medication (n = 34) Psychotherapy (n = 33) Medication (n = 31) Psychotherapy (n = 41)
Association with treatment willingness
Variable
r
p
r
p
r
p
r
p
Depressive symptoms
.03
.87
.39
.03
.53
<.01
.23
.16
Depression mind set
.34
.05
.11
.54
.17
.37
-.08
.64
Prognostic pessimism
.13
.46
.06
.74
-.07
.72
.16
.33
Emotional Constraint
.15
.40
.23
.20
-.22
.23
-.03
.83
Regulation Worth
-.01
.98
.18
.31
-.06
.73
.06
.72
Hijack
.28
.11**
.28
.11**
-.22
.24
-.22
.16
CEQ antidepressant
.32
.06*
.01
.94
.32
.08*
.13
.42
CEQ psychotherapy
-.02
.90
-.01
.98
.18
.35
.15
.35
Doubts
.15
.39
.48
.01
.30
.10
-.20
.20
Note. Treatment willingness = willingness to accept initial treatment referral; Depressive symptoms = Quick Inventory of
Depressive Symptoms - Self Report, sans item 12; Emotional Constraint = Emotion and Regulation Beliefs Scale, Emotional
Constraint subscale; Regulation Worth = Emotion and Regulation Beliefs Scale, Regulation Worth subscale; Hijack = Emotion
and Regulation Beliefs Scale, Hijack subscale; CEQ antidepressant = Credibility and Expectancy Questionnaire, antidepressant
medication; CEQ psychotherapy = Credibility and Expectancy Questionnaire, psychotherapy; Doubts = response to question
“Did you have doubts about any part of the study?”
* Correlation between CEQ antidepressant and treatment willingness when combining across explanation conditions is r(63) =
.32, p = .01, for participants who received medication referrals.
** Correlation between ERBS Hijack scores and treatment willingness when combining across referral types is r(65) = .28, p =
.02, for participants given the fixed biological explanation.

Table 13

DISCUSSION
Explanations for Depression, Elaboration Likelihood, and Treatment Willingness
The present study yielded some evidence in support of the hypothesis that causal
explanations for depression and the type of treatment offered interactively impact
willingness to accept treatment, such that individuals given a malleable explanation for
depression are more likely to accept referrals for psychotherapy than those given a fixed
biological explanation. However, this effect was moderated by participants’ level of
credulity with regard to the study and the depression screening test cover story. Further,
the direction of this moderation effect was unexpected, in that the interaction of causal
explanation condition and treatment referral type paradoxically had a greater impact on
treatment willingness among participants who reported having doubts about the study.
This outcome was especially surprising given that on the whole participants who had no
doubts about the study showed greater willingness to accept treatment than those who
reported having doubts.
Differences in current depressive symptoms across the different combinations of
causal explanation and treatment referral type may partially account for the observed
interaction effect on willingness to accept treatment. However, this explanation alone is
insufficient, given the size of the interaction effect and the fact that the effect remained
significant after adjusting for current depressive symptoms. It appears that the
experimental manipulation of causal explanations for depression in the present study did
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have a large effect on willingness to accept psychotherapy, but that this effect only
occurred in participants who reported having doubts about the study.
One possible explanation for the moderating role of doubts observed in the
present study is that the experimental manipulation might have required active cognitive
scrutiny and elaboration on the causal explanations for depression in order for the
interactive effect on treatment willingness to emerge, and reporting doubts about the
study may have been a by-product and marker of that active scrutiny. The rationale for
this interpretation draws upon the elaboration likelihood model (ELM; Petty, Brinol, &
Priester, 2009; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The ELM describes two potential ways in which
one might process and evaluate information: either actively through effortful scrutiny
and elaboration on the content of the message (the central route), or passively by
applying pre-existing heuristics activated by peripheral or contextual features of the
message (the peripheral route).
Participants were told that, based on their performance on a brief reaction time
test, they had been identified as being at very high risk for developing depression and
should therefore seek treatment immediately, so as to avoid the onset of a full depressive
episode. This cover story about the depression screening test may have been inconsistent
with participants’ prior knowledge and beliefs about how depression and other
psychological disorders are assessed and diagnosed. In addition, the bogus feedback
provided—that the test results show very high risk for depression—was likely
inconsistent with many participants’ recent subjective experiences, given that the sample
was not preselected for elevated depressive symptoms. Thus, if participants evaluated the
cover story and bogus feedback by actively scrutinizing the information presented and
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comparing it to their prior knowledge from other sources, then it would arguably be both
reasonable and likely for them to have doubts about some part of the study.
Alternatively, participants who processed the cover story and bogus feedback via
the peripheral route may have relied on contextual features such as how polished the
speaker appeared to be, accompanying visual cues, or the setting in which the
information was presented in order to decide whether to accept the message, instead of
actively considering the merits of the information itself (Petty et al., 2009; Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986). As Petty and colleagues (2009) state, “the source of a message can
trigger a relatively simple inference or heuristic such as ‘experts are correct’ that a person
can use to judge the message.” Indeed, the video clips used in the present study to convey
the cover story and information about depression were designed to include peripheral
cues likely to enhance their persuasiveness. For example, the actor appearing in these
videos wore professional attire, identified himself as “a researcher and clinician,” and
described the depression screening test as a tool being developed by “researchers at
Mississippi State University.” If participants evaluated the cover story and bogus
feedback by applying heuristics related to pre-existing trust in doctors, mental health
experts, or the university as an institution, then they might have passively accepted the
messages at face value without identifying any doubts about the study.
It is important here to make a distinction between perceived accuracy or validity
of the depression screening test and bogus personalized feedback, and perceived accuracy
or validity of the information presented about depression in general. Because none of the
participants suspected that the study involved deception, it is highly likely that they
accepted the general information about the causes of depression even if they doubted that
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depression risk could be detected by a brief reaction time test or disagreed with the
feedback about their personal level of depression risk. Indeed, among participants who
reported doubts about the study, those given the fixed biological explanation still
exhibited significant differences in the predicted directions from those given the
malleable explanation, when asked to rate the likelihood that various factors could cause
depressed mood.
If the participants who were able to identify and verbalize doubts about the study
were indeed more actively examining and making inferences about the information
presented throughout the study, and if they accepted the general information about the
causes of depression as valid, then this difference in processing style could potentially
account for the role of doubts as a moderator of the interactive effect of causal
explanation and referral type on treatment willingness. Participants who viewed the fixed
biological explanation for depression were presented with conflicting messages: (a)
depression is caused by genetic and physical features that are out of a person’s control
and can only be altered with medication, and (b) the participant should make an
appointment to begin psychotherapy, which will provide behavioral and cognitive
strategies aimed at altering depression risk. A participant who was actively scrutinizing
the content of these messages and making inferences would likely notice a
contradiction—the root of the problem in depression is genetic and biological, yet
psychotherapy does not alter the underlying biology—and might therefore be unwilling
to engage in psychotherapy as a treatment for depression, even if they were to actually
feel depressed in the future.
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However, both of the above messages came from the exact same source and were
presented in the exact same context. Therefore, a participant who passively processed the
messages might have simply accepted both of them on the grounds that they came from a
trustworthy or knowledgeable source, and might not have checked them for logical
consistency. Thus, this participant would be just as willing to engage in psychotherapy as
a treatment for depression as they would have been if they had viewed the malleable
explanation instead. Indeed, this is what we found in the present study. Among credulous
participants we saw no difference in treatment willingness when comparing the fixed
biological and malleable explanation groups who received psychotherapy referrals.
In summary, some people might engage in active scrutiny and elaboration of
messages they hear about mental illness, risk factors, or treatment whereas others might
passively accept such messages on the basis of peripheral features such as perceived
trustworthiness of the source. Reporting doubts about the study may have been an
indicator that participants engaged in effortful processing via the central route. In the
present study, effortful thought about the content and implications of causal explanations
for depression might have been necessary in order for the interactive effects on treatment
willingness to emerge. This would explain why we only found the interaction among
participants who reported doubts about the study.
The literature on dual-processing models such as the ELM identifies a range of
factors that can impact decisions about whether to engage in effortful or passive
processing, including situational factors such as perceived trustworthiness and expertise
of the source, personal interest in the subject matter, extent to which the message is
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consistent with prior beliefs, and more stable individual differences such as need for
cognition situation (Heesacker, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1983; Petty et al., 2009).
Need for cognition refers to a preference for effortful cognitive engagement
across a range of situations (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Individuals high in need for
cognition tend to evaluate messages based on active scrutiny of their informational
content even when the source of the message is perceived to be credible (Priester & Petty,
1995). Such individuals also tend to be more persistent in their beliefs and skeptical of
messages aimed at persuading them to think differently (Haugvedt & Petty, 1992).
Participants high in need for cognition would likely have been intrinsically motivated to
scrutinize and cognitively elaborate on the information about depression that was
provided as part of the present study. In contrast, individuals low in need for cognition try
to expend the minimum cognitive effort they deem necessary to reach an acceptable
conclusion, and are therefore less likely to scrutinize a message when the source is
believed to be honest and knowledgeable (Priester & Petty, 1995). They can, however, be
prompted to engage in more effortful scrutiny of messages when situational cues indicate
that the information source is not credible.
In the present study it is possible that the provision of inaccurate feedback about
depression risk prompted effortful processing. Nonetheless, the observed interaction
effect cannot be explained as an experimental artifact, because all of the participants saw
the same bogus feedback. The majority of participants were not actually depressed and
therefore had reason to believe the feedback was inaccurate, yet only some of them had
doubts about the study. This suggests that factors other than the experimental cover story
played a role in determining whether or not participants engaged in active scrutiny of the
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information that was presented, and that such scrutiny is a novel determinant of future
action in combination with other previously established factors.
Finally, it is notable that among participants who did report having doubts about
the study, those who viewed the malleable explanation for depression and received a
psychotherapy referral exhibited much greater willingness to accept treatment than any of
the other three cells, including the cell of participants who viewed the fixed biological
explanation and received a medication referral. In other words, the combination of a
malleable explanation for depression and the option of psychotherapy as a treatment had
a protective effect, allowing this group of participants to be just as accepting of treatment
as those who did not have doubts about the study. This, too, seems to suggest that the
interactive effect of causal explanation and referral type on treatment willingness may be
linked to differences in scrutinizing the credulity of depression assessments.
Factors Correlated with Treatment Beliefs and Willingness to Accept Treatment
In addition to the findings already discussed, the present study shed light on the
different factors associated with treatment beliefs and willingness to accept treatment for
participants at each level of the independent variables—causal explanation and referral
type. First, we found that across both causal explanation conditions participants were
more willing to accept referrals for psychotherapy than for antidepressant medication.
This effect held up when controlling for current depressive symptoms, as well as when
the binary doubts variable was included, though it was reduced somewhat when
participants’ treatment history was taken into account. Surprisingly, among participants
referred for psychotherapy there was no relationship between perceived credibility and
effectiveness of psychotherapy and willingness to accept treatment, in either causal
78

explanation condition. Thus, either participants were not able to accurately report their
beliefs about psychotherapy, or their decisions about whether to accept a referral for
psychotherapy were not based on explicit beliefs about psychotherapy’s effectiveness for
treating depression.
In contrast, perceptions of the credibility and effectiveness of antidepressant
medication for treating depression were related to willingness to accept treatment among
those participants who received medication referrals, across both causal explanation
conditions. This finding is notable given that participants in the malleable explanation
condition rated antidepressants as significantly less credible and effective than
psychotherapy for treating depression. Further, examination of the marginal means
showed that CEQ ratings for antidepressant medication among participants given a
malleable explanation were lower than CEQ ratings for either treatment type among
participants given a fixed biological explanation. Taken together, these findings suggest
that providing information about the malleability of biological risk factors for depression
may reduce the perceived credibility and effectiveness of antidepressant medication,
which in turn may make individuals less willing to accept this form of treatment. We will
return to this topic later in the discussion.
Interestingly, for participants who viewed the fixed biological explanation for
depression and received a referral for antidepressant medication, current depressive
symptoms showed no relationship to willingness to accept treatment. Instead, treatment
willingness for this group was moderately positively associated with perceived credibility
and effectiveness of antidepressant medication (as already noted), belief that depression
is a fixed entity that one cannot alter, and belief in emotional hijack or the power of
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strong emotions to take over and cause a person to lose control. This constellation of
findings may have implications for individuals who are given a fixed biological causal
explanation for depression and who believe themselves to be at elevated risk of becoming
depressed—for example, due to a family history of the disorder or having previously
experienced a depressive episode themselves. The present study seems to suggest that
these individuals may base decisions about taking antidepressant drugs not on the
presence of depressive symptoms at the time of the decision, but on a sense of fatalism
about their ability to improve depressed moods or regulate their emotions in general, as
well as faith in the effectiveness of antidepressant medication.
In contrast, for participants who saw the fixed biological explanation and then
received a referral for psychotherapy, current depressive symptoms showed a mediumsized positive relationship with willingness to accept treatment. Again, treatment
willingness was also moderately positively associated with emotional hijack beliefs.
Among participants who viewed the malleable explanation for depression and
received a referral for medication, current depressive symptoms showed a large positive
relationship with willingness to accept treatment, and perceived credibility and
expectancy of antidepressant medication was moderately positively associated with
treatment willingness. This seems to suggest that individuals who believe themselves to
be at risk for developing depression but who are given information about the malleability
of biological risk factors base their decisions about whether or not to take antidepressant
medication on their actual level of depressive symptoms as well as their faith in the
effectiveness of medication as a means of decreasing those symptoms.
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Of all four groups, the participants who viewed the malleable explanation for
depression and received a referral for psychotherapy proved most difficult to characterize
with regard to factors potentially affecting treatment willingness. None of the variables
measured in the present study, including current depressive symptoms, were significantly
related to willingness to accept treatment.
Causal Explanations for Depression and Beliefs about Emotions
At the group level, participants given a malleable explanation for depression
reported greater belief in the power of strong emotions to take over and cause people to
lose control of their thoughts and actions. This effect remained significant when the
binary doubts variable was included in the analysis. Moreover, with the doubts variable
included as a factor, the effect of causal explanations on emotional constraint beliefs also
approached significance; again, participants given the malleable explanation for
depression endorsed stronger emotional constraint beliefs than those in the fixed
biological explanation.
It was initially surprising to see stronger emotional constraint and hijack beliefs
among participants who were told that emotional processing styles could be altered.
However, the direction of these effects may indicate that at a group level, the malleable
explanation produced a stronger conceptual link between depression and strong emotions
than the fixed biological explanation, thereby conveying the sense that emotions are
powerful and capable of constraining and even derailing healthy functioning.
The group-level effects of causal explanation on emotional constraint and hijack
beliefs were qualified by the pattern of correlations observed within each explanation
condition. Specifically, among participants given the malleable explanation for
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depression, beliefs about emotion and its regulation were unrelated to beliefs about
depression and the extent to which depressive symptoms can be changed. Moreover,
participants in the malleable condition who endorsed stronger emotional hijack beliefs
also viewed emotion regulation as more worthwhile and attainable, which differs from
previous research with the ERBS wherein hijack beliefs and regulation worth were found
to be unrelated (Veilleux et al., 2015).
Conversely, in the fixed biological explanation condition, entity beliefs about
depression and about emotions in general tended to cohere. For individuals in this
condition, there were strong positive relationships between depression entity beliefs and
the beliefs that emotions constrain and hijack a person’s functioning. There was also a
medium-sized negative relationship between depression entity beliefs and regulation
worth, suggesting that persons who hear a fixed biological causal explanation for
depression and believe that depression is a fixed feature of individuals that cannot be
changed will also tend to see emotion regulation as less attainable and less worthwhile.
The present study demonstrates a link between beliefs about the causes of
depression and beliefs about the power and malleability of emotional experiences in
general, and shows that experimentally manipulating the former produces effects in the
latter. This link is important, as it suggests that messages about the causes and nature of
mental illnesses likely impact a broader set of beliefs about one’s psychological and
emotional functioning.
Implications of the Present Study for Treatment of Depression
It is important to bear in mind the preliminary nature of the present findings, as
many of the results discussed here arose from exploratory analyses. Additional studies
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will be crucial to determine whether or not the pattern of results observed here replicates.
It is with these caveats in mind that we consider the present findings and their potential
implications with regard to the treatment of depression.
Implications for Treatment with Psychotherapy
One of the main goals in designing and conducting the present study was to
examine whether holding a fixed biological explanation for depression would impact
beliefs about or acceptance of psychotherapy. The results of this study did, in part,
support our hypothesis, but the predicted effect was limited to individuals who expressed
doubts about the study—perhaps because these individuals engaged in more effortful
scrutiny and elaboration on information about the causes of depression, and therefore
made inferences related to biological essentialism that might undermine willingness to
participate in psychotherapy.
This constellation of findings, upon further replication and translation, suggests
the benefit of disseminating information about the malleability of biological risk factors
for depression. One implication of the present study is that not everyone will see a
contradiction between a fixed biological causal explanation for depression and the use of
psychotherapy as a treatment, because some individuals will accept both messages on the
grounds that they come from a trusted source (for instance, both messages might come
from a clinician practicing interpersonal psychotherapy). However, for others—those
inclined to scrutinize and make inferences about causal explanations—a contradiction
will emerge, and to the extent that they have adopted a fixed biological explanation for
depression they may be less willing to accept psychotherapy as a treatment.
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To our knowledge, no studies to date have examined relationships between need
for cognition and treatment preferences in depression. However, the literature does
indicate that individuals high in need for cognition are less stressed by cognitively
demanding tasks (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) and prefer taking an active
role in problem solving. For instance, there is a strong association between need for
cognition and endorsement of statements such as, “I prefer to figure things out for
myself” (Amabile, Hill, Hennessey, & Tighe, 1994). In the present study, among
participants who reported doubts there was a significant difference between the causal
explanation conditions in perceived likelihood that depression could be caused be
“beliefs or style of thinking,” whereas no such effect was found among those who had no
doubts about the study. Perhaps active thinkers found the malleable explanation more
compelling or consistent with their experiences than those who engaged in more passive
processing, and therefore were more swayed by it. It is possible that persons who highly
value effortful thought and tend to scrutinize the world are not inclined to accept passive
treatments for depression such as antidepressant medication, regardless of their beliefs
about the causes of depression. Yet, the present study suggests they may be open to a
treatment that affords more autonomy such as psychotherapy, but only if it is logically
consistent with their understanding of the causes of depression. At present this idea is
largely conjecture, but these findings lay out a clear target for future research.
Implications for Treatment with Antidepressant Medication
We also found evidence suggesting that information about the malleability of
biological risk factors for depression might reduce the perceived credibility and
effectiveness of antidepressant medication as a treatment for the disorder, and that such
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beliefs may play a role in decisions about whether or not to seek out or accept
antidepressant medication. Two alternative interpretations of these findings arise, and
conclusions about which interpretation is more plausible hinge on one’s view of
antidepressant medications. If one starts from the premise that antidepressant medications
are an effective and useful means of treating depression, then the present findings seem to
indicate that messages downplaying the role of genes and neurobiology in causing
depression discourage the public from seeking out and benefitting from effective
treatments. From this perspective, one might conclude that clinicians and researchers
should promote a disease model of depression, and research findings that run counter to
this message should be discussed with care.
Alternatively, one might start from the premise that antidepressant medications
are no more effective than placebo for all but the most severely depressed individuals,
and they often produce unwanted side effects. From this perspective, the present findings
suggest that perceptions of antidepressant medication as a credible and effective
treatment for depression depend at least in part on a belief that depression is caused by
fixed biological factors, such as faulty genes producing a chemical imbalance in the
brain. Therefore, clinicians and researchers should emphasize the malleability of
biological risk factors for depression, so that individuals are less likely to take ineffective
drugs that produce side effects on the basis of what is at best a vastly oversimplified idea
about the causes of depressive symptoms.
The tension between these alternative viewpoints cannot be resolved solely by
reference to the present set of findings. It is well beyond the scope of this study to
determine the effectiveness or clinical utility of antidepressant medications as a treatment
85

for depression, nor can the present study determine the comparative validity of fixed
biological or malleable models of depression. In any case, it is likely that both of the
conclusions outlined above would be too simplistic, given the lack of clear group-level
effects in participants referred for medication. Indeed, at the group level individuals who
heard the malleable explanation for depression were no less willing to accept a
medication referral than those who heard the fixed biological explanation—this was the
case regardless of whether participants had doubts about the study. Rather, results from
this study suggest that attributing depression to either fixed biological or malleable
factors may impact a complex web of relationships among other beliefs about depression,
emotion and its regulation, and treatment options.
It is possible that the act of seeking or accepting antidepressant medication may
be motivated by different factors and hold different meanings depending upon how one
conceptualizes depression. For instance, the present findings suggest that persons who
attribute depression to fixed biological causes may be more likely to seek antidepressant
medication to the extent that they believe individuals cannot alter depressed moods or
regulate emotions on their own. Conversely, persons who believe that depression is
caused by malleable factors may be more likely to seek antidepressant medication to the
extent that they are actually experiencing depressive symptoms. If these findings prove
to be replicable effects, then it will be meaningful to consider whether and how such
differences color engagement with and experience of treatment, and ultimately the odds
of recovery.
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Strengths and Limitations
Use of a Student Population
Recruiting from a student population allowed us to assess individuals with a wide
range of prior knowledge and attitudes toward psychological disorders and treatment,
whereas clinical samples might disproportionately include individuals who already have
favorable attitudes toward treatment. Depressed individuals might also have more fixed
beliefs about causes of depression—perhaps due to greater previous exposure to
information about the disorder, or due to personal experiences—and therefore a one-time
manipulation might not be sufficient to change their beliefs. Finally, recruitment of an
undergraduate sample allowed us to test our hypotheses with emerging adults, and given
that the median age of onset for mood disorders in the United States ranges from 25-32
years old (Kessler et al., 2005), beliefs about depression may be especially important in
emerging adulthood.
One drawback to recruitment of a student sample, rather than a sample prescreened for elevated depressive symptoms, is that the findings that emerged may not
generalize to a clinical population. In addition, the fact that the majority of our
participants did not have elevated depressive symptoms may have made it more difficult
to convince participants of the accuracy and validity of the depression screening test
(although no participants identified that the present study used deception or guessed the
true purposes of the study prior to debriefing). These were limitations of the present
study, but in our view these limitations were outweighed by the benefits of a sample
drawn from emerging adults who were not pre-screened for depression.
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Random Assignment to Treatment Option
In most previous studies examining relationships between causal explanations for
depression and beliefs about treatment, effects on beliefs about psychotherapy and beliefs
about antidepressant treatment were not measured separately. Therefore, those studies
could not evaluate whether the effect of causal explanations for depression on treatmentrelated beliefs or behaviors is moderated by type of treatment offered. In the present
study, random assignment of participants to both a causal explanation condition and a
treatment referral condition allowed us to test for the hypothesized interaction. The
design of the present study also allowed us to identify the different factors associated
with treatment willingness within each combination of causal explanation and referral
type.
Decision Not to Include a Control Group
The present study was not aimed at determining how much each causal
explanation might differ from no explanation (i.e., a control condition), but rather at
examining the effects of the fixed biological and malleable causal explanations in relation
to one another, and the extent to which those effects were moderated by type of treatment
offered. The decision not to compare causal explanations to a “no explanation” condition
was based in part on an interest in ecological validity. Outside of a laboratory setting it
would be very unusual for an individual to be diagnosed with depression or told they are
at risk for depression without being given any information regarding the causes or nature
of the disorder. In fact, certain types of assessments may, in and of themselves,
communicate certain causal explanations; for example, assessment of family history, tests
of genetic factors, or brain imaging may imply a biological basis for depression even if
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no such explanation is provided explicitly. Thus, the malleability condition might provide
a more ecologically valid alternative to a fixed biological explanation than a condition in
which participants are given no information about depression or the implications of their
test results.
Nonetheless, inclusion of a control group could further understanding of the
absolute impact of specific causal explanations, whereas the present study only provides
information about the comparative impact. This is a limitation of the present study.
However, the findings that emerged can help inform the design of follow-up studies that
do include control groups, and therefore allow for more detailed parsing of the effects of
each type of causal explanation.
Use of Videos
Video clips were used to give participants the depression screening test results, to
present causal explanations for depression, and to provide treatment referrals and pose
follow-up questions. Use of pre-recorded videos, rather than scripts presented by
experimenters in person, reduced the potential for experimenter error and minimized the
chance of experimenters being asked questions that could have altered their interactions
with participants during the experiment. Videos also guarded against the possibility of
unintended effects owing to the gender, ethnicity, or other individual characteristics of
experimenters. In sum, use of videos helped ensure that key aspects of the experiment
were delivered in exactly the same way for all participants in a given condition.
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Future Directions
Responses from the funnel debriefing questionnaire provided insight into
potential ways of strengthening the IAT and cover story in future research. Although
participants did take the cover story at face value and accepted that the IAT was intended
as a depression screening test, many participants questioned whether the test could
accurately measure one’s depression risk. In future studies the cover story could likely be
improved by increasing the number of IAT blocks that participants complete so that the
test seems more thorough, or by incorporating other emotional processing tasks and
presenting the depression screener as a battery of measures rather than a single test. The
cover story may also be improved by expanding the explanation of how reaction time
tasks can measure individual differences in the processing of emotional information, and
how these differences relate to depression risk.
Many of the findings presented in this manuscript arose from exploratory
analyses, and therefore follow-up studies will be crucial to determine whether or not the
pattern of results observed here replicate, and to test the robustness of those findings. For
example, because the role of doubts as a moderator of our experimental results was
unanticipated, the present study did not directly assess how participants went about
evaluating the information presented. Additional research will be needed to more fully
examine the role of effortful versus passive processing as a potential moderator of the
relationship between causal explanations for depression and treatment willingness.
Further, the literature of cognitive processing styles indicates that a wide range of factors
such as individual differences in need for cognition, personal interest in the subject
matter, extent to which the message is consistent with the listener’s self-concept, and
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perceived trustworthiness of the information source can jointly determine elaboration
likelihood in a given situation (Heesacker et al., 1983; Petty et al., 2009). Thus, research
will also be needed to assess which factors are most relevant in determining how
individuals evaluate messages about the causes of depression.
Based on our results, it seems that some of the key effects of causal explanations
for depression could only be observed within specific combinations of causal explanation
and treatment referral type. Although we ensured proper power for the current study,
follow-up studies designed with this point in mind could include larger sample sizes to
increase statistical power for detecting and comparing differential influences on treatment
decisions. Follow-up studies could also attempt to manipulate beliefs about the credibility
and effectiveness of antidepressant medication more directly to see whether changes in
these beliefs do indeed impact willingness to accept treatment. In order to better parse the
impact of each causal explanation, future research can include control groups and
incorporate pre-manipulation measurements of beliefs, for comparison. Further studies
will also be needed to examine whether the effects observed here extend to populations
with elevated symptoms of depression.
Although examining willingness to accept treatment provided a useful starting
point for our research, the present findings suggest that this metric may not capture the
full impact of beliefs about the causes of depression. Rather than directly altering
treatment willingness, it seems that different causal explanations may lead individuals to
seek treatment for different reasons, and may shape their beliefs about the malleability of
depressive symptoms and emotions in general. Thus, future studies will be needed to
examine whether and how such differences impact engagement with treatment, the ways
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in which individuals experience and interpret changes in symptom severity, and
ultimately the odds of recovery.
Conclusion
The present study was the first to our knowledge to experimentally examine
whether causal explanations for depression impact willingness to accept a referral for
psychotherapy. Our findings indicate that information about the malleability of risk
factors for depression may have a protective effect that specifically benefits skeptical
individuals who otherwise would not accept treatment, allowing them to be open to
psychotherapy.
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FUNNEL DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE PRESENTED VIA COMPUTER
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We are interested in assessing participants’ perceptions of the study. We want to
make sure that our design is sound, and we need your feedback to help us improve this
study. Please be as honest as possible in your answers; no feedback we receive, including
negative feedback, will result in a loss of research credit. In fact, negative feedback is an
important way for us to improve upon our design for future studies. Be as detailed as you
feel is necessary to fully answer each question. You may spend as much time on these
questions as you want, but we ask that you spend a minimum of 5 min answering these
questions.
In your own words, what was the present study about?

Please tell us your opinion of the depression screening test (the computer test that
asked you to match words) and your results from the test:

In your opinion, how accurate was the information about depression that was
presented?

What do you think was the purpose of the questionnaires you completed and the
questions you were asked in the video clips?

Did you have any doubts about any part of the study?
If so, please describe what you thought:
What part of the study made you feel doubtful?
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DEBRIEFING SCRIPT PRESENTED VIA VIDEO
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The true purpose of this study was to test how different messages about the causes
of depression affect a person’s willingness to accept treatment. Research shows that
willingness to get treatment, beliefs about treatment, and expectations for the future
significantly affect depressive symptoms and recovery from depression. Therefore, it is
very important to understand whether and how messages about the causes of depression
influence these factors. Ultimately, this study and others like it can help doctors,
psychologists, and counselors understand the best ways of communicating with people
about depression, so as to encourage depressed individuals to get treatment and to
develop positive expectations about the future.
In order to examine our research question, we needed to tell participants a
believable cover story to explain why we would be offering them treatment for
depression, and to give them a reason to consider accepting treatment. So, we told you
that the computer task you completed was a depression screening test. We told you that
we had calculated your score, and that your score showed high risk for depression. In
reality, the computer task you completed does measure one aspect of processing of
emotional information, but we did not look at your performance on the task at all. Your
score has not been calculated, so we have no idea how accurate your responses were. In
fact, researchers will not calculate any participant’s scores on the task until data
collection for this study is finished, which may not be for several months.
In the video that you watched after finishing the computer task, this graph was
shown (graph of bogus test score is displayed again) and you were told that the numbers
on the graph represent your personal score on the computer task. Actually, the scores
presented in this graph were totally unrelated to any aspect of your actual performance, or
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any other personal characteristic. Every participant in this study is shown the same graph
depicting the same results, and every participant is told that their score means they are at
high risk for depression.
Next, the video presented information about the causes of depression. This
information was intentionally selected to communicate a certain type of cause, and
therefore it emphasized some findings from depression research while downplaying or
leaving out other findings.
In reality, current research suggests that depression is caused by a combination of
genetic, biological, environmental, social, and psychological factors. The exact nature of
these causes and the ways in which they interact are not yet fully understood, but risk
factors include:
•

Personal or family history of depression

•

Major life changes, trauma, or stress

•

Certain physical illnesses and medications
Depression, even severe cases, can be treated. The earlier that treatment can

begin, the more effective it is. Depression is usually treated with medications,
psychotherapy, or a combination of the two.
After you saw the video about the causes of depression, you were asked about
your beliefs about treatments and coping strategies and your beliefs about how long
depression lasts. You also responded to a series of video clips that asked about your
willingness to get treatment today or in the future. Again, the purpose of using deception
in today’s study—for example, telling you that you were at high risk for depression—was
to provide a believable cover story to explain why we would be offering treatment for
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depression, and to give you a reason to consider treatment. The cover story allowed us to
present you with certain information about the causes of depression and then measure
your willingness to accept treatment.
Now that you understand the true nature of the study, you have the chance to
decline permission for the data that we collected from you to be used for research
purposes. After this video, your experimenter will return and present you with the real
informed consent form. You are free to ask us not to use your data in our study analysis.
If you decline to let us use your data, you will still receive course credit, just as you
would if we use your data in our analysis. This is entirely voluntary, but we hope to
analyze as much data as possible to better understand the effects of beliefs about the
causes of depression on decisions about treatment to eventually help individuals with
depression.
In any case, we respectfully request that you do not talk to any other MSU
students about this study. If future participants find out the details of the study in advance
then our cover story will not be convincing to them, and the responses they provide will
not be valid. If this happens, then our study data could lead us to draw the wrong
conclusions about how best to help people get treatment for depression.
Finally, the researchers of this study want to thank you for participating. You
have made a valuable contribution to this important research. Ultimately, this study and
others like it can help doctors, psychologists, and counselors to explain depression in a
way that encourages depressed individuals to get treatment, and treatment for depression
can save lives.

108

MEASURES

109

Note: Items measuring prognostic pessimism, beliefs about causes of depression,
and willingness to accept treatment are included in full within the Measures section in the
body of this document.
Emotion Regulation and Beliefs Scale (ERBS)

1. Emotions operate like a floodgate that is either open or closed. In other words,
emotions are either “on” or “off.”
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

2. Emotions can either be expressed entirely or hidden from others—it isn’t possible
to share only part of an emotional response.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

3. People can learn to control/regulate their emotions.
1

2

3

Strongly Disagree

4

5
Strongly Agree
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4. People are ruled by their emotions.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

5. Putting forth effort to alter emotional experience is valuable.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

6. When a person has a strong emotional reaction to another person, they will always
feel that way about that other person.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

7. When people are feeling down, they have to wait for a better mood to arrive
before they can be productive.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

8. People would be better off if they took time to figure out where their emotions
come from.
1

2

3

Strongly Disagree

4

5
Strongly Agree
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9. When strong emotions are present, they dictate what a person says or does.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

10. When an emotion comes along, it will continue unless there is a change in the
environment.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

11. When people acknowledge their emotions, the emotions will completely take
them over.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

12. Learning how to alter strong emotions is a worthwhile pursuit.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

13. It is possible, with effort, to alter strong feelings in any situation.
1

2

3

Strongly Disagree

4

5
Strongly Agree
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14. When a person feels really angry, it’s virtually impossible to not take the anger
out on people or objects nearby.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

15. People are slaves to their emotions.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

16. People would be better off if they spent more time learning how to control their
emotions.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

17. Strong emotions will make people do things they wouldn’t normally do.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

18. When feelings of sadness take over, a person can’t really do anything but wallow
in the misery.
1

2

3

Strongly Disagree

4

5
Strongly Agree
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19. People benefit from learning how to regulate their feelings.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

20. It’s virtually impossible for people to act opposite to the way they feel.
1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

21. Emotions make people lose control.
1

2

3

Strongly Disagree

4

5
Strongly Agree
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Credibility/Expectancy Questionnaire (CEQ)
Set I
1. At this point, how logical does the treatment described above seem?
1

2

3

4

not at all logical

5

6

7

8

somewhat logical

9
very logical

2. At this point, how useful do you think this treatment would be in reducing
depressive symptoms?
1

2

3

4

not at all useful

5

6

7

8

somewhat useful

9
very useful

3. How confident would you be in recommending this treatment to a friend who
experiences depressive symptoms?
1

2

3

4

not at all confident

5

6

7

somewhat confident

8

9

very confident

4. By the end of the treatment period, how much improvement in depressive
symptoms do you think would occur?
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%
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60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Set II
For this set, close your eyes for a few moments and try to identify what you really
feel about the treatment and its likelihood of success. Then answer the following
questions.

5. At this point, how much do you really feel that the treatment would help to
reduce depressive symptoms?
1

2

3

4

not at all

5

6

7

somewhat

8

9
very much

6. By the end of the treatment period, how much improvement in depressive
symptoms do you really feel would occur?
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%
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60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Quick Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology—Self-Report (QIDS-SR)
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